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L ib a tio n s

Sing, Muse, o f conflict, the seed o f selfish labor.
How destruction and tragedy grow from its root.
What people will do for property and pride,
O f what will be sa crifie^ for one's right.
Tell of dead fish and dry streams, the birds' last feast,
How poison creeps through the land, by human hand and fate.
Let us hear of the break between people.
That threatens our common future.

-If Helen were a river, what then?

"Never under-estimate the power of water."

m
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P rologu e
Upper Clark Fork Basin is a place o f rolling mountains and headwater streams;
where heavy mantels o f pine and fir cover ridges like buffalo robes keeping off the cold
and wind; where protruding-elbow-hillsides get chapped and grow tough with cushion
plants; and arid valley lowlands lie draped in bunchgrass lace. This is home to elk, deer,
osprey, bear, chokecherry, cutthroat, woodpecker, bighorn, bitterroot, raven, crayfish,
grouse, mycorrhizae, dragonfly, ninebark, magpie, coyote, to name only a few o f the
diverse species native to the Basin. It is also home to a political species.
The political species, humankind, plays a special role in the Basin by virtue o f its
capacity to influence the landscape more than any other species. While other species seem
to participate in the landscape, humans are distinct as the species that takes control of the
landscape, changing it to meet human-defined needs and interests. This is not to say that
other species do not change the environment by living in it — they do. But humans are
distinguished by the relative magnitude o f the changes they, or we, induce. The Berkeley
Pit, for example, a giant, open-pit mining site in the upper reaches o f the Basin, changes
the landscape much more dramatically than, say, a ground squirrel colony or even a
marmot colony. Similarly, extensive cattle ranching introduces new species to the Basin,
thereby diminishing and changing the habitat available to native species. As a result of these
and other activities, the Basin landscape is largely a human creation.
Part of this landscape that humans transform is its waterways. Coursing through
the Basin is the river for which it is named; a river changed by mining, ranching, power
production and other human activities. From the continental divide to Milltown Dam,
inconspicuous trickles gather into streams, which in turn gather into creeks, and then into
rivers. The Clark Fork mainstem begins in Deer Lodge Valley, where Silver Bow Creek
meets Warm Springs Creek. Farther down it takes in the Little Blackfoot River, then Gold
1
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Creek, Flint Creek, and finally at the lower end o f the Basin, Rock Creek and the Blackfoot
River, At Milltown Dam the river leaves Upper Clark Fork Basin, travelling on through
gorges and reservoirs, whitewater and fish ladders, to join the Columbia and return to the
sea.
Throughout the Basin, humans use this water, as do other species. The many life
forms of the Basin have this in common; all rely on water. But human use of water is again
distinguished by the magnitude o f its effect on the rest o f the Basin community. For
example, when water is diverted for irrigation, stream temperatures change, fish lose
habitat, and riparian habitat loses its productivity. When these effects are multiplied by
numerous irrigation projects, they begin to influence the very viability of fish and wildlife
populations. Toxic runoff from old mining sites and soil erosion add to this. Together, we
humans have the capacity to transform these waterways to a point where the Basin will no
longer be a viable home for some species, possibly even ourselves. In view of this, there is
reason to be thoughtful and circumspect in deciding how we use these waterways and what
shape we give the Basin's landscape.
This paper is about how landscape decisions are made. More specifically, it is
concerned with how this political species, the human population, o f Upper Clark Fork
Basin, Montana will decide the future of the Basin's waterways.
There are a variety o f ways in which this decision could be made. Often, the
political species makes its choices in a chaotic manner; individuals pursue their own
interests throughout the Basin, the results o f which combine into a situation that can be
thought o f as the culmination of many choices. This method, the chaotic method, is
legitimized by the custom of private property and seems to work fine until disputes erupt
between individuals. When disputes occur, which is fairly often, political struggles tend to
ensue. Struggle is another common method o f decision-making. Played out in various
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political arenas, the struggle to dominate characterizes adversarial methods of decision
making. Adversarial methods are a potential back-up system for the chaotic method. These
also seem to work fine, unless one happens to lose the struggle.
A third and perhaps less common kind of decision-making is found in collaborative
methods. These can be used to resolve disputes that erupt via the chaotic method, or as a
substitute for the same. Collaborative methods are designed to resolve differences through
discourse, building consensus on decisions rather than struggling to dominate. By
emphasizing constructive struggle, the political species can make choices in common and
not just as individuals. Collaborative methods are ways of reaching agreements on what to
do, thus deciding together. Such approaches can also be taken before disputes develop.
In Upper Clark Fork Basin, transfiguration o f the waterways has so far come about
in a predominantly chaotic manner. Individuals with water rights and property rights have
pretty much pursued their own interests, remaking the landscape to meet their own ttesigns
with little regard for the larger picture. The harmful impacts o f some activities, the
combined impacts o f the many activities, and the needs of other species were seldom taken
into account so long as they were unknown, water seemed plentiful, and no one objected.
But since people have become more cognizant o f environmental impacts and water has
become more scarce, objections and disputes have developed and multiplied. The dispute
focussed on in this paper revolves around whether the Basin's remaining unclaimed water,
what little there is, will be reserved for wildlife or reserved for irrigation, l The issue at
hand is whether it would be better to make this decision in an adversarial or a collaborative
manner.

^ Looming in the background are other unresolved disputes and serious water quality
problems; including an ominous acid bath, the Berkeley Pit, gradually filling up at the top
o f the Basin.
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The Basin is a place where decisions have often been made on the basis of
adversarial struggles. In this it is not unique. Culturally-honored political practices like
majoritarian rule and litigation are based on the idea o f struggle between opposing interests.
These practices set up a convention, or rule, by which to pick a winner. Opponents base
strategies on the expectation that the winner takes all and the loser gets nothing, which is
often the case. Such conventions may be adopted out o f esteem for their conceptual
simplicity and seeming effectiveness in resolving difficult issues, or just on the basis of
cultural norms. It should be realized, however, that they can also be oppressive,
reductionist, and may entail various other significant costs —economic, social, political and
environmental. Adversaries in the heat of struggle, bouyed by consciousness o f their
rights, may not recognize these costs or may perceive them as a necessary part of settling
divisive issues. But once aware that there are alternatives in the form of collaborative
methods, it is possible to weigh costs more deliberately and rethink adversarial
conventions.
Where landscape decisions are concerned there are many reasons to prefer a
collaborative approach. In the chapters that follow, these are discussed both generally and
more specifically in terms o f issues concerning Upper Clark Fork Basin that are now being
deliberated. Many o f these reasons are drawn from the study of processes o f environmental
dispute settlement. This provides insight into the shortcomings o f adversarial methods and
what this means for public decisions. Additional reasons for exploring a broader
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of collaborative methods are drawn
from studies o f public participation in resource planning.
Issues of fairness, as well as the epistemological and semantic bases of public
decisions, are also important. At the heart of collaborative methods is an interactive process
that implies the possibility of reaching agreements that are meaningful and trustworthy. By
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exploring theories of meaning and interactive communication, one can see the reductionism
and oppression o f adversarial methods. Ultimately, adversarial approaches to decision
making tend to produce one sided decisions and monolithic interpretations of the public
interest. Frequently, such actions end up obstructing rather than settling decisions and
impairing the quality of decisions by reducing the issues on which they are based.
Finally, the study of communications and dispute resolution has also led to the
development o f model decision-making procedures which are used as prescriptive
guidelines for facilitating collaboration. These procedures are introduced and considered in
terms o f their applicability to the future o f the waterways of Upper Clark Fork Basin,
Montana.
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I. L an d sc ap e
Upper Clark Fork Basin is a place where the political species makes its home. Its
landscape is influenced by climatic, geological, and ecological factors which have effected
the distribution of species throughout the region. It is also influenced by cultural factors
which have informed human activities in the region. The future well-being of the Basin
hinges on how these factors come together. The relationship between evolved life patterns
and a colonizing human culture can be judged felicitous only if it can pass the test o f time.
Human activities and their consequences are not exempt from natural selection. Like other
species, we must be adapted to the Basin environment in order to thrive here. Unlike other
species, we have a choice; we can either wait and see if our innovations hold up or we can
become critical and try to tailor our innovations to evolved patterns.
The choice of whether to continue culturally approved practices or to begin a
process o f evaluation and possibly change rests primarily on whether we perceive problems
with current practices. It makes little sense to fix what is not broken. This is true o f
production technologies as well as decision-making technologies. But the perception of
problems is complicated by our interests. One cat's crisis is another cat's cream. Many of
the problems in the Basin have this ambiguous character. Activities may be poorly adapted
to the Basin environment, but still approved of within the culture and desirable because of
short term interests. This type of situation leads to environmental disputes when the
activities of some people are deemed harmful or poorly suited to the environment by others.
In recent years. Upper Clark Fork Basin has become the scene of environmental
disputes. Part o f its human population is content to continue practices which others have
evaluated as problems that merit change. These disputes are rooted in the Basin landscape
which is both a natural and human construction. In order to understand the disputes one
must first consider the Basin's natural character and the culture for which it is home.
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The Basin. Upper Clark Fork Basin is a continuous region in Western Montana,
drained by the Upper Clark Fork River and its tributaries. It is also a water planning unit
defined by the State of Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
(DNRC).^ As a planning unit, the Basin is one of several such units administered and
overseen by the State. Until recently, the region has not been organized as a political unit
and has had no planning organization by which Basin citizens could plan its future
intentionally and inclusively. Because o f a newly formed basin planning committee,
organized by DNRC, this may now be possible to some extent. The basin committee was
formed to resolve an entrenched dispute by developing a comprehensive plan for the
Basin's waterways, excluding Blackfoot River and Rock Creek.
The Basin is bounded to the east and south by the Continental Divide. Abutting to
the north and west are other basins that drain into the Clark Fork River farther downstream;
Flathead Basin to the north and Middle Clark Fork Basin to the west. The official line
dividing it from Middle Clark Fork Basin is Milltown Dam, which sits just below the
confluence of the Clark Fork and Blackfoot rivers. It is a large region, covering a
horizontal area of nearly six thousand square miles. The landscape is mountainous with
peaks reaching upwards of 10,000 feet along the divide, and the river flowing from about
5000 feet at its head down to about 3300 at the dam.

2 Sub-basins may also be treated as planning units under the state’s Natural Resources
Information System. In this Basin, the Blackfoot River and Rock Creek drainages are
regarded separately for some planning purposes.
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Because the flow o f water connects upstream and downstream areas and influences
the distribution of plant and animal species, the boundaries o f the Basin form a good
ecological unit. The continental divide and the Flathead divide to the north are important
natural boundaries between major river systems. Although the line between Upper Clark
Fork Basin and Middle Clark Fork Basin seems more or less arbitrary, it too makes sense
when human impacts are considered. Since the upper basin drains into the middle basin,
the two are obviously connected; the Middle Clark Fork is not a separate river system. But
Milltown Dam has a major effect on the river's water quality, changing its character at this
point The upper basin is characterized by poor water quality due to mining tailings, most
of which get trapped behind the dam. The boundary also serves to limit the size o f the
Basin, making a more manageable planning unit.
By virtue of proximity, the native flora and fauna of the Basin are similar to that of
neighboring basins. Higher elevations are mostly slopes forested with douglas fir and
lodgepole pine associations. Wildfires are a part o f these forest's ecology. Valleys are
characterized by bunchgrass prairie, mostly fescues and wheatgrass intermixed with a
surprising assortment of drought-tolerant forbs and less important grasses.^ Riparian areas
tend to support chokecherry, willow, black cottonwood, and many other berry producing
shrubs. The several basins also support similar associations of ungulates, predators, small
mammals, birds, reptiles, insects and fish, with some differences resulting from climatic
and geological variations between the basins.
The region is semi-arid, with higher elevations receiving most o f the rainfall. Upper
Clark Fork Basin is substantially dryer than Flathead Basin to the north due to the influence
of Flathead Lake, whose broad surface area is the source of substantial evaporation which

3 "Less important" in an ecological sense means simply that these grasses account for a
smaller proportion of the total ground cover than other species.
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later becomes rainfall over the mountains and valleys east of the lake. Another difference
between these two basins is glaciation. The Upper Clark Fork was never glaciated and so
has none o f the rich glacial till and pothole ecology^ that can be found in the Flathead. In
this it is similar to Middle Clark Fork Basin, which also was never glaciated and has no
major lakes. But since this region's weather generally moves from west to east, the Upper
Clark Fork gets somewhat less precipitation than the Middle Clark Fork Basin. Storms
have less moisture to drop by the time they reach the Upper Basin.
Geologically, Upper Clark Fork Basin is unique for its ore deposits and mineral
soils. Copper, gold, silver, arsenic and phosphate have been mined in the Basin and have
also influenced its ecology and water quality. Even before mining began, heavy metals and
arsenic were washed into the waterways with each year's spring flood.^ As a result, heavy
metals, acids produced by their oxidation, and arsenic have influenced natural selection in
the Basin for a long time. Riparian flora and fauna have had to be tolerant o f these toxins in
order to survive here.^ But such tolerance has limits. The species of the Basin have adapted
to natural amounts of toxins that come with the normal, gradual erosion o f the mountains.
This is much less than what has resulted from mining, which increased erosion
dramatically by digging and breaking up the ores.
Newcomers. Minerals have also influenced the Basin's ecology by attracting
humans to the region. More than an hundred years ago, prospectors and miners came to
find gold and copper and gain wealth from its ores. They came to mine, but also to live.
Food, dwellings, and fuel were necessary. Schools, churches, transportation, decent
^ Potholes are shallow ponds formed when large chunks of ice broke off from retreating
glaciers. These wetlands are important nesting sites for migrating birds and are a unique
landform providing habitat for and influencing the behavior of numerous other species.
5 Source: Abe Horpestad, Water Quality Bureau, Montana Department of Health and
Rivironmental Sciences (January 30,1992).
®Source: Paul Hanson, Montana Riparian Association, University of Montana School of
Forestry (May 28, 1992).
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clothing and tools were expected. These humans brought their culture with them and settled
in the Basin because it was a place where their expectations might be realized. With wealth
in the ground, plenty of fuel, and unclaimed land, the Basin appeared to have the material
potential to make culturally informed expectations and ambitions come true.
The people who settled the Basin came from many different places. Gold began to
draw prospectors to the area in the 1850s. Some came to escape the chaos and disruptions
o f the Civil War, others simply to find a better life than they had in the East. The Western
Frontier was a land of opportunity, promising land and wealth to people who lacked this in
the East. It was also a land where opportunists could use their wealth to build an inland
colony. When copper and silver veins were discovered, industrial mining began generating
demand for labor in the Basin and a supply o f metals for the growing industrial nation.
Butte, USA became a destination for immigrants and Easterners in pursuit of the American
Dream. The Treasure State was on the map.
As mining developed, support industries were also necessary. Agriculture became
important early on. Food for the growing population was grown partly in the Basin and
partly in the neighboring Bitterroot Valley. In the Upper Basin, hay and grain were the
major crops. Irrigation and the production o f cattle for export have been important here
since the last century. Meanwhile, railroad tracks were laid through the Basin to connect its
parts and connect the whole to the outside economy. Timber was harvested for fuel,
dwellings and railroad ties. Logs and building materials later became a third major product
exported from the Basin. Mining products, cattle, and timber are the Basin's primary
exports, and their production has been a livelihood for many residents.
The culture, or mix o f cultures, that people brought to the region reflected their
many diverse origins as well as the larger industrial economy o f which it was a colony.
This hybrid culture was alien to the Basin and tied into the demands o f a remote and
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sprawling nation. As a result, demands and the practices used to meet them were
sometimes "out o f synch" with the Basin's natural, unique limitations. Rex Myers
describes Montana's endemic cycle o f boom and bust in the following passive;
More subtly came a legacy o f boom and bust: a cycle built on an extractive
economy, dependant on outside markets, tied to non-renewable or unwisely
managed resources. Since the gold rush o f the 1860s, the process has
repeated itself in silver, copper, coal, petroleum and other minerals. Finite
in quantity, these minerals generated prosperity. Communities, which often
rose suddenly with discovery, would decline precipitously when the supply
was exhausted. Renewable resources such as lumber, livestock and farm
produce followed similar fluctuations. Mismanagement or overuse, the
result was quick profits followed by temporary exhaustion. Yet even for the
best managers, changes in market conditions far from M ontana, or
alterations in regional weather patterns, produced the same rise and fall in
revenue and optimism.^
Despite hard times, the people of the Basin take pride in its history. The Copper
Kings of Butte are well-remembered. Visiting Butte and Anaconda, the promise o f good
old days can still be felt —the boom time, when wealth was waiting deep in the mountain
for immigrant men who would brave the journey — then the hard truth o f hard work
making tough people. Miners have ridden the boom and bust o f the untamed West.
Ranchers too have a proud heritage o f independence and the ruggedness to weather
droughts. Their role is to produce the essential stuff of life; food and fiber without which
other industry would be lost. Miners, ranchers, and loggers all know the spirit of this land
— it bucks and jumps and keeps on cornin' —and alot of people get thrown off, or at least
laid off.
Impacts on the Landscape. Under the influence of this culture, the Basin has
sustained the effects o f more than a hundred years o f mining, ranching, and forestry.
Urban areas, recreation and other industries have also affected the landscape and the water
that courses through i t Today the landscape still appears relatively untrammeled to the

Myers (1984), p. 6.
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untrained eye; human population density is relatively sparse, forests still cover much of the
mountains, big game and fish are plentiful in some parts. But many aspects o f the
landscape have been altered dramatically since the advent of Euro-American settlers.
Mining has long been an economic mainstay of the Upper Clark Fork. It has also
contributed more than any other activity to the degradation o f the Basin's waterways. First
it was gold, then silver, copper, arsenic, phosphate and gravel. The legacy of this mining
history includes three Superfund sites. Superfund was established by Congress in 1980 to
clean up major toxic waste sites across the nation. These three sites — Silver Bow Creek/
Butte, Anaconda Smelter, and M illtown Reservoir — are the direct results o f mining
activities in the Butte-Anaconda area. A fourth Superfund site, the Montana Pole site in
Butte, was generated by chemical treatment o f utility poles, posts and bridge timbers.®
Under the combined influence of these sites, the Basin has become a toxic landscape.
These Superfund sites are on their way to becoming a significant scar on the Basin
landscape. At present, however, the place is more o f an oozing, open wound. The three
mining sites include several smaller sites. Among these are the giant Berkeley Pit, several
tailings ponds, devastated riparian areas strewn with tailings, and several sites polluted by
the processing o f ores and related products. Copper, arsenic, and acid runoff from tailings
have pretty much killed Silver Bow Creek, and pollute the entire mainstem in varying
degrees depending on dilution from inflowing creeks. Heavy metals accumulate behind
Milltown Dam, where they pollute the aquifer. So much arsenic has seeped into the
groundwater that many residents of Milltown can no longer drink safely from their wells.
Having been identified under Superfund, these former mining sites are now the
subject of a Federally administered diagnosis and clean-up process. The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the sites' present owner, Atlantic Richfield Company
®"Clark Fork Basin Project: Status Report and Action Plan" (1988), sec. 3, pp. 21 - 23.
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(ARCO), reportedly work closely together to determine the extent o f the problems and
devise solutions. Litigation to determine how much of this damage should be paid for by
ARCO is also in process. Despite public meetings and presentations designed to explain to
residents what is going on, the actual decision-making process remains relatively opaque,
making the close relationship between EPA and ARCO somewhat suspect. Whether this
close cooperation will lead EPA to diagnose the problems in a way that benefits ARCO at
the expense of the Basin community remains to be seen. Basin dwellers have little influence
over the decisions of EPA.
Meanwhile, EPA and ARCO assure the public that an effective and reasonably
thorough clean-up will eventually be implemented. Some projects to transform tailings
ponds into wetlands and restore devastated streamsides are already underway. The Warm
Springs Ponds near Anaconda, for example, are laid out in a series that works as a three
tiered filtering system for the water passing through them. The nearly still water in the
ponds allows heavy metals to settle out and stop oxidizing. Natural sedimentation will
gradually bury these potential toxins, holding them in place and preventing the formation of
acids. Although this sounds good, there are concerns regarding how wise it is to leave all
these toxins in the flood plain. A good flood could flush out these wetlands, stirring up the
sediments and the problem all over again. Moreover, the dams that hold these ponds in
place are not fool proof. Just recently, a leak was discovered. The ability of these structures
to withstand annual flooding and earthquakes is by no means certain, though it is clearly
much less expensive than trying to remove the tailings from the flood plain altogether.
The Berkeley Pit is another formidable problem for which a viable solution has not
yet been determined. Now that it is no longer being mined, the Pit is gradually filling up
with extremely acidic groundwater. If the rate o f fill continues, it will be full in about thirty
years. Although this gives ARCO and EPA some time to figure out what to do, the
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existence of a giant acid bath at the top o f the Basin is nevertheless disturbing. Human
constructed bulwarks in underground mining shafts are part of what is holding this acid in
place. So far, these are holding nicely, but whether they will continue to do so as the
weight of the liquid increases is uncertain. If the bulwarks break, the adjacent active mining
operation would be flooded, possibly releasing this acid into the Basin waterways.
Other mining sites in the Basin also contribute to the toxicity of its waters. The hills
are dotted with smaller mining shafts, some o f which ooze a copper colored liquid,
shunned even by insects. Placer mining, too, disrupted numerous creek beds, destroying
riparian habitat and adding to the overall degradation of the river system. Although some of
these smaller sites are beginning to be addressed under a State version of the Super fund
program, their effects will continue to be felt for a long time. Meanwhile, the mining of
Butte Hill continues. Ore is currently being pulled out o f the hill faster than ever before.^
But although mining continues, its practices have changed. Littering streams with toxic
waste is now illegal and consequently avoided. The current mining operation is
considerably less harmful to the Basin than its predecessors.
The overall results o f mining in the Basin mean that the life forms in the Basin,
including humans, must adapt to living with poisoned water. Although the residents of
Milltown have found alternative sources o f water, the river's fish are not as lucky. Copper
is extremely toxic to these fish and their populations have decreased substantially, mainly
due to the impacts on spawning habitat. Hatchlings are especially vulnerable to heavy metal
poisoning. Fish that do survive in diluted parts o f the river may still be toxic to the
predators that eat them. Osprey are particularly vulnerable since their diet consists almost
exclusively of fish. Other species that drink this water are also affected, although little
research has been done to determine the extent of these effects. Acid streams also repress
^ Source: Marvin Miller, Montana Bureau o f Mines and Geology (January 30, 1992).
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algae and riparian vegetation, further degrading the habitat o f fish and other wildlife. The
upshot is that toxic waterways and their consequences are now part of the Basin landscape
within which context other life activities must go on.
Ranching has also been a major influence on the Basin landscape in the last hundred
years. The introduction of cattle to the region affected native wildlife by usurping grazing
land that was previously used by bison, elk, deer and antelope. Today, bison are long gone
and antelope are rare. Although elk and deer still subsist fairly well in the forested areas,
they too feel pressure from the overgrazing o f National Forest lands. Predators,
meanwhile, were slaughtered to protect cattle. The Basin's wolf population has been
annihilated and its grizzly population reduced to remnants. Cougars, black bears, and
coyotes have also been reduced in number, but to a lesser degree since these species also
benefitted from the removal of more efficient predators.
The region’s flora has also been changed by grazing cattle. Native bunchgrass
prairie has been degraded by overgrazing and invaded in some places by hardier exotic
species like quackgrass and knapweed. In other places, native prairie has been replaced by
human-favored species imported for hay production. Forested areas have also been grazed,
sometimes depleting undergrowth and interfering with forest regeneration. These impacts
have in turn affected the lives and habitat of the many insects, spiders, birds and small
mammals that rely on native species.
Poor ranching practices have also led to soil erosion problems and organic pollution
o f the waterways. Overgrazing o f the prairie destroys its plant cover, loosening soils
previously anchored by the deep roots of bunchgrasses. This soil is then either lost to the
wind or finds its way into the Basin's waterways. Uncontrolled grazing along streams and
wetlands destroys riparian vegetation, destabilizing banks and transforming streambeds
into muddy wallows. Resulting siltation of streambeds poses an additional obstacle for the
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river’s poisoned fish. Uncontrolled riparian grazing also allows organic waste, primarily
phosphates and nitrates in the form of cow pies, to be dropped directly into streams. This
addition deteriorates water quality with bacteria and causes algal blooms which degrade the
habitat of fish and other riparian wildlife. Excessive algae depletes oxygen and modifies
habitat by covering streambeds and surfaces with algae. Runoff from feedlots also
contributes to nutrient pollution.
Perhaps the most dramatic transformation o f the landscape that has resulted from
ranching is irrigation. In the arid west, irrigation has long been viewed as the key to
successful agriculture. In Upper Clark Fork Basin, agriculture means ranching. Irrigation
increases hay production, thereby increasing the cattle crop both in weight and numbers. It
also stabilizes production levels which would otherwise be more susceptible to the periodic
droughts which are characteristic o f the region. For these reasons, irrigation projects dot
the Basin's waterways much as old mining sites dot its hillsides. Most of these are small
diversions and canals tailored to the needs o f individual ranches. There are also a few larger
reservoirs which serve the needs of several ranches.
Irrigation effects the Basin's waterways by removing water from streams and
changing the path of water through the Basin. This inflicts drought conditions on riparian
areas. Riparian vegetation becomes less productive, which in turn affects the wildlife that
depends on it. For fish, less water means less habitat, including important spawning areas.
Dewatering also increases water temperatures, putting additional stress on fish, especially
hatchlings. When streams are diverted completely, habitat loss and drought conditions are
taken to the extreme. Although most o f the diverted water eventually finds its way back into
streams as runoff, this does little to offset damage done to riparian species.
Dewatering due to irrigation also complicates the Basin's water quality problems. In
lieu of cleanup, the effects of toxic waste from mining and other activities are diminished
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only by dilution. This requires relatively clean streams flowing into the mainstem. When
these streams are diverted for irrigation, dilution does not occur. As a result, the damage to
fisheries in the mainstem is intensified while other potential fish habitat is lost in the
tributaries. Although toxicity problems can hardly be blamed on irrigators, their actions
nevertheless contribute to the destruction o f the Basin's fisheries.
The Dispute. Between displacement of species, soil erosion, and exacerbation of
the river’s water quality problems, ranching has altered the Basin’s evolved life patterns
considerably. As a result, ranching practices have come under fire. Resource managers and
environmental advocates are especially critical o f what is happening to the Basin’s
fisheries. Fish populations have been depleted dramatically from the combined effects of
mining and ranching. Although remaining populations appear stable, they are threatened by
two trends. Ranchers feeling economic pressure to increase productivity look to future
irrigation projects for relief. At the same time, pressure from fishing is increasing due to the
promotion of tourism and outdoor recreation as environmentally sensitive alternatives to
extractive industries. The growing importance o f recreation to the region's economy is a
strong incentive for protecting the Basin’s fish. This conflict of interests has now
developed into a complicated dispute and led to the formation o f the basin planning
committee mentioned earlier.
This situation is complicated by additional impacts o f timber harvesting and
municipal waste. Although timber is less important in the Upper Clark Fork than in basins
to the north and west, the amount o f harvesting is still substantial. Clearcutting is the usual
practice. This removes forest cover and organic matter from the Basin’s slopes, affecting
the habitat o f numerous plant and animal species. In addition, the land may be scarred by
bulldozers to help regeneration or tom up when trees are dragged from stump to truck.
Both of these practices result in soil erosion which adds to the siltation o f streambeds.
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Municipal wastes, meanwhile, are a major source of nutrient pollution in the Basin, Algal
blooms and oxygen depletion are commonly found at sewage outflows, even when
wastewata* has been treated.
Power production is also part o f the picture. This industry also influences the
Basin's waterways, primarily because o f downstream demands. There are two hydropower
dams in the Basin, one on Flint Creek at Georgetown Lake, and the Milltown dam. These
have added reservoirs to the Basin and introduced new obstacles for migrating fish.
Together with larger dams downstream on the Clark Fork and Columbia, they also generate
a demand for full streams. Power production is a major industry in the Northwest. It is also
the most cost-efficient use of the river in the region. The economic benefits o f irrigation
cannot compare to those o f power. As a result, power production is another major incentive
against future irrigation projects. With a few seasonal exceptions, diversion o f water for
irrigation also diverts potential watts away from the power industry.
The dispute which has developed around the welfare o f the Basin's fisheries is
complex because so many different human activities have contributed to the overall
degradation of the waterways. Although future irrigation has been targeted as a major threat
to fish, the Basin's problems cannot be attributed to irrigators alone. Technically speaking,
however, restricting irrigation to ensure the river's dilution looks like an easy solution.
Politically, it is not so simple. Ranchers are an influential group in the state, and their way
of life has been mythologized into a symbol of rugged independence. To engage in political
struggle with ranchers, is to take on the mythos of the American West.^® At the same time,
the economic interests in fish and full streams undercuts the credibility o f resource
managers and environmentalists who claim the fish are at risk. Because o f this it seems

High Country News (1987), pp. 9 - 10.
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unfair for ranchers to be asked to sacrifice their interests for the sake of tourism and power
production.
This dispute came to a head in 1987 when two applications for water reservations^ ^
were filed with DNRC. Montana Department o f Fish, Wildlife and Parks requested that
most o f the Basin's remaining unclaimed water be reserved as instream flow in order to
protect fish, wildlife and recreation from the negative impacts of additional diversions and
other harmful activities. At the same time, the Granite County Conservation District
requested that part of the Basin's unclaimed water be reserved behind two new dams in
order to meet future irrigation needs which might otherwise be precluded by competing
demands on the Basin's water supply. Given the Basin's limited supply o f unclaimed
water, both of these are not possible. Water can either be kept in the stream or held in the
reservoirs; there is not enough to go around.
The Committee. Having received these requests, DNRC prepared an EIS
examining the need and probable effects o f each. Norm ally, the Board o f Natural
Resources and Conservation would then have granted or denied the requests on this basis.
But in this case, an unlikely coalition o f ranchers and environmentalists intervened,
lobbying legislators to instead impose a moratorium on reservation decisions and new
allocations in the Basin. These lobbyists had participated in a privately funded effort to get
the Basin’s opposing interest groups talking and solving their problems together. They had
reached an agreement among themselves that a moratorium was a good idea because it
would allow time for a group like themselves to work out a mutually agreeable solution to
the dispute and related problems. The legislature agreed, enacting the formation o f a multiinterest basin committee to sort out the controversy surrounding the two applications and
1^ Water reservations are a special kind o f water right available to governmental units.
They must be granted if need is established, and take precedence over claims of beneficial
use on which water rights are based.
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develop a comprehensive plan for future water use in the Basin. In 1991, the Upper Clark
Fork River Basin Steering Committee was formed and given until December 1994 to
develop its plan.^^
This basin committee is also an integral part of Montana's developing State Water
Plan. In 1988, DNRC began implementing a collaborative approach to water basin
planning. Their policy goal is to set up representative basin committees in each o f the
state's water basins in order to develop plans that address the unique conditions, problems
and interests pertaining to each water basin in the state.

So far only two o f these

committees have been formed. Upper Clark Fork Basin Steering Committee is one o f them.
The committee's status as part o f the state's water planning process explains why it was
mandated to develop a comprehensive basin plan, rather than just developing a solution to
the reservation dispute.
The basin committee's purpose is to find a way to distribute the Basin's limited
water resources that will satisfy Basin humans. Such a plan may or may not meet the needs
of the Basin's other species. In order to do so, it will have to overcome substantial cultural
inertia.
Historically, ecological issues have not been a major concern of water users in the
American West. When settlers occupied the West, they used water on a first come, first
served basis. As they discovered the aridity o f the region, water was claimed more
opportunistically, giving rise to an ethos of "use it or lose it." Resulting use patterns and
water flows rarely make a coherent whole. The many uses were never integrated in a way
to reflect concern for whole watersheds or best use of a limited resource. In some basins,
the amount of water claimed is three or more times the average annual flow. The concept of
*2 Northern Lights, "Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee, October 28,
1991 Meeting Summary.”
Martin (1987).
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"planning" to meet collective interests was, in most instances, simply not considered.
When water planning did occur, it was usually for the sake of facilitating and maximizing
human use o f the resource, without regard for ecological effects. Diversions, ponds and
canals built by private landowners are products of water planning. Government planning,
meanwhile has produced massive interbasin diversions, dams, reservoirs, and streamlined
channels.^'* Only recently have environmental issues begun to enter the picture as adverse
ecological affects and (he limits o f the resource become more apparent.
The legacy of this history is a dramatically altered landscape and a historically
rooted conviction that water is there to be used, if only we can engineer a way to get it. The
ecology of water basins remains secondary to human interests, despite growing under
standing that the resource is limited and that human interests are ultimately dependent on
the welfare of larger ecological systems. In this context, it makes sense to introduce a
planning process that will emphasize the ecological processes at work in a water basin and
consider possible water uses with reference to these. Whether the basin committee can do
this is unclear.
The reservation dispute in the Upper Clark Fork can be viewed against the broader
issue o f sustainability and our relationship to the Basin's evolved patterns, but this is not
the committee’s expressed purpose. In many human eyes, fish, like water, exist to be used.
Despite the "catch and release" practice o f many recreational fisherpersons, fish are
managed as a crop. Improved water quality and higher stream flows stand to increase
productivity, which in turn increases economic benefits to humans. Although some Basin
humans would probably like to see a healthy river for its own sake, or for ecological or
even aesthetic reasons, such motivations rarely seem to enter the political arena. Useoriented values are much more common.
14 Reisner (1986).
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A representative planning process may simply perpetuate and apply the notion that
water is out there waiting to be used. The basin committees could endorse new projects to
alter the landscape and exploit its water potential despite negative side-effects. In this case,
water planning could continue to ignore basic ecological realities. This is speculation, but it
points to serious concerns regarding the potential effects o f representative procedures.
Along similar lines as the classical argument that tyranny of the masses should be avoided
by placing government in the hands o f an educated few, an argument can be made against
granting power over an ecological system to people who don’t understand how it works. If
planning is guided more by political interests than any qualifying knowledge or expertise,
the potential for ultimately harming the water basin and the long-term interests o f its
inhabitants is significant.
This interpretation of the situation, however, is by no means the only one possible.
From a standpoint of ecological concern, there is reason to devise and introduce a planning
process that gives ecological systems priority over use-oriented interests. From other
standpoints, the importance of ecological processes and problems is debatable. In the event
that people do not accept this, the elitist character o f the classical argument becomes
evident. If specialized knowledge o f ecological systems is a prerequisite to deciding what
uses of a resource are acceptable, then many people are excluded from this decision. The
requirement that other interests be framed in terms o f sustainability and special regard be
given to ecological problems can be viewed as a form of procedural hegemony. Framed in
other terms, environmentalists are just one of many interests groups that want things their
way. In view of this, a process that stresses environmental interests over other interests in
the resource is liable to be regarded as politically biased and resisted.
Montana's approach to basin planning does not give any special status to ecological
systems and problems. Instead, it is designed to resolve conflicts between the various
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interests in a water basin before these erupt into serious public disputes. Multiple interests,
based on different perceptions and different priorities, are a central issue in resource
planning. The challenge of resource planning is developing and implementing policies and
allocation schedules that satisfy multiple interests without irreversibly damaging the
resource in question. The new approach focuses on building consensual agreements
between multiple interest groups, regardless of ecological consequences. The question of
what is or is not damaging to the resource, meanwhile, is based on legal standards and
regulations which limit the scope of agreements. The possibility that existing legal limits are
not sufficient to protect the resource is cause for concern. Any concern for ecology over
and above what the law prescribes depends on the members and context o f the planning
committee.
Although this process may fall short of our ideal ecosystemic approach to planning,
it still has promise from an environmental standpoint It is possible that consensus building
will benefit ecosystems by building understanding between diverse interest groups and by
averting resource conflicts. Building understanding between interests can benefit the
ecosystem by promoting broader recognition the relevance of ecological issues and
concerns. Resource conflicts, meanwhile, tend to absorb valuable time and energy while
problems persist. Collaborative problem-solving allows important decisions to be made —
rather than delayed. Despite concern that basin ecology will be ignored, it may also be
respected.
Because the basin committee is undertaking to plan the region's use of water, it has
an opportunity to consider the issue of sustainability in doing so. In planning the future of
the Basin's waterways, it must choose between possible human activities which vary in
how well-adapted they are to the Basin environm ent, among other qualities. This
opportunity to select our future collectively is a radical departure from the chaotic pursuit of
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self-interest that led to this juncture. The committee provides an opportunity for Basin
citizens to begin thinking broadly about the Basin's future, beyond immediate economic
interests. Whether this will happen remains to be seen.
In general, the activities that have transformed the Basin were based on culturally
informed technologies and values that were imported from elsewhere and did not reflect the
established ecological character and lim itations o f the Basin. Instead, the abrupt
introduction o f new styles o f production and living disrupted established ecological
patterns. The new patterns, based on industrial civilization and human-defined needs and
interests, were superimposed over existing patterns, causing disruptions because the old
and new come into conflict at many points.
Disruptions of this kind are not necessarily bad or immoral, but need to be
understood as innovations which may or may not fit within the limitations o f the Basin's
ecology. The choice between patterns and the struggle between old and new is not a simple
a matter of preference; in this case one of the patterns has been reinforced by thousands of
generations of gradual evolution. The notion that a pattern which dates back no more than
three or four or even twenty generations can stand as a viable substitute for nature's slowly
refined creation could be interpreted as reckless. Yet this kind of thinking seems to have
guided us in transforming the landscape. This is especially true when new patterns tend
towards depletion or disequilibrium . That is, if the new pattern is not stable and
sustainable, excessive disruption could be unravelling both patterns without regard for the
slow stitches of nature's seamstress.
The choice between patterns is a choice between a range o f possible human
activities. The relationship between evolved patterns and human possibilities must be
appreciated if we are to choose our actions responsibly. This relationship also precedes
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understanding modem environmental disputes. These have roots in colonialism, manifest
destiny, and the universalizing tendencies of modem science.
Recently introduced modem practices are sometimes defended by pointing to the
"unreasonableness" of environmentalists who expect people to have no impact on a place
they live in. The idea of having no impact on the environment is an impossible ideal, easily
portrayed as absurd. This is problematic because it obscures the more realistic criticism that
our impacts should fit with established ecological pattem s by not skewing them too far
toward in sustainability. If this defense against environmentalists is taken seriously, it
reveals a basic misunderstanding o f ecology and what is at stake. The defense portrays a
winner take all scenario where colonizers can either have everything they want or nothing at
all. This looks suspiciously like a zero sum game, an adversarial struggle, with nature
itself. The problem is we cannot win against nature the way we might against one another.
If nature loses, we lose —it is that simple.
Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee was bom o f conflict. There's a
saying in the West that whiskey's fo r drinking and water's fo r fighting. Upper Clark Fork
Basin is no exception. The Committee came about because an adversarial dispute over the
Basin's finite rivers and streams reached an impasse. But the committee itself departs from
this paradigm. Its formation is an attempt to involve all sides in a collaborative effort to get
beyond stalemate and move forward into a shared future. By providing a forum in which
political discourse can com plem ent political struggle, the com m ittee provides an
opportunity for the humans of the Basin to improve their interaction with one another, and
possibly with the landscape as well.
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n . D ivide an d C o n q u er
We need a story in which the processes o f communality and mutual
responsibility are fundamental. We need to figure out how many popula
tions we have, try to name their dreams, and begin resolving those dreams
into a societal agenda for the future. It would seem reasonable to expect our
politicians to take the lead in such processes, but they don't; they don't
seem capable.
We need to take our politics back from the lawyers and the professionals
and the boys with money (this is true, clearly, at every level in our
democracy). If we can work our way through to public consensus the
bureaucrats and lawyers will follow.
- William Kittredge, 1992

E nvironm ental Disputes. The environm ental dispute in Upper Clark Fork
Basin, like others, is characterized by many humans having different designs for the same
limited resource. Resolving such disputes requires a decision-making process. W hile
personal decisions may be made by weighing our various interests and choosing one or
some combination, the process o f making decisions that affect more than one person is
more complex. Such decisions become necessary when the interests o f individuals or
groups come into conflict and limited resources make it impossible for all parties to have
what they want. The development of disputes is a familiar a social pattern. This pattern or
type of problem, human conflict, is the probable origin o f politics and government.
In a broad sense, environmental disputes can be understood to include all
disagreements that involve the appropriate condition o f the place in which we live. This
includes everything from land use to job availability to air quality, green lawns, paved
streets and correct behavior. All o f these are aspects o f the human landscape around which
conflict can occur. This landscape, our habitat or community, is a limited resource. In this
broad sense, all human disputes can be thought o f as environmental, or landscape,
disputes.

27
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In narrower terms, environmental disputes are just the subgroup of human disputes
comprising those that have to do with the use, non-use, or abuse o f lim ited natural
resources. This includes renewable resources like fish and trees, nonrenewables like
petroleum, and common necessities to life like clean air and water. Conflicts over the
proper allocation and management o f these resources have increased in frequency and
importance as the frontiers o f unclaimed land have diminished before an expanding
industrial culture and a growing human population.
As industrial culture expands into alien landscapes and other cultures, it disrupts
traditional ways of relating to landscapes. When industrial practices are poorly suited to
local conditions, damage results. Other damage results from the introduction o f cultural
values that encourage the exploitation o f resources. The economic rewards of exploitation
undermine traditional practices and disrupt the intricate resource management systems of
indigenous cultures. These harmful effects are complicated and augmented in many places
by a rapidly growing human population. Resulting poverty and its attendant desperation
contributes as well to the disruption o f traditional environmental controls. Per capita
consumption of resources is also growing in many places.
The picture is a crisis o f overwhelming proportions. The planet has become like a
large pie being fought over by its cannibal children. The finite nature of resources and the
consequences o f their distribution affects everyone. Because these resources are limited,
issues o f fair distribution and appropriate use are inseparable from the larger picture.
Inequities in world resource distribution are part o f an engine that drives the ongoing
depletion. The comparative wealth of some people is both an ideal sought by those with
less, and a major cause o f the fact that those with less are finding it difficult or impossible
to fulfill their basic needs. Poverty and the breakdown of traditional management systems
Myers (1984), p. 18.
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is a widespread condition driving many people to use anything and everything available in
their own environments to do this. Virtual scouring of the environment is destroying the
renewable resource potential of many parts of the world. This leaves less o f a resource base
worldwide with which to satisfy the growing needs o f a growing population.
In some situations, attempts to restrict environmental degradation have inadvertently
harmed people and landscapes. By increasing poverty, restrictions on industry can end up
causing more degradation than they prevent. This is not to say that restrictions and
regulations are universally bad or harmful, but rather that we need to be circumspect in
evaluating the probable outcomes o f these measures. In order to protect resources
effectively we need to consider what people want and need and find ways to balance this
within the limits o f available resources. In short, we need ways of living that are
sustainable and acceptable to the people who are expected to undertake them. If restrictions
are going to be effective in protecting resources, they must go hand in hand with the
development o f realistic alternatives to exploitative practices, which in turn must be
informed by an understanding o f the problems faced by people who rely on these
resources.
The several possible approaches to making landscape decisions can be thought of as
a set o f tools with which to confront this formidable array o f disputes and difficult
decisions. This tool kit includes approaches identified as chaotic, adversarial, and
collaborative. Once disputes have developed, the choice of alternatives is narrowed to
adversarial and collaborative methods. The chaotic approach, which describes situations
where the landscape is shaped by the aggregate o f independently pursued human interests,
breaks down when the limited nature o f resources makes it impossible for all o f these

World Conservation Strategy (1980), Our Common Future (1984).
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interests to be realized. In other words, the chaotic approach causes disputes to develop,
creating a need for alternatives.
Alternative decision-making procedures are explored in depth in the growing
literature on alternative dispute resolution. This field of study addresses public disputes of
all kinds, including environmental, or landscape, disputes. Collaborative approaches, in
particular, have become a subject o f considerable interest as shortcomings o f more
traditional adversarial methods have become more evident. Environmental disputes have
received attention because they have increased in frequency in recent decades, a trend
which is likely to continue.
Stalem ate in the Courts. Bacow and W heeler, in their seminal w ork on
environmental dispute resolution, recognized four standard methods o f dispute resolution;
litigation, arbitration, negotiation and mediation.

O f these, litigation and arbitration are

predominantly adversarial, while negotiation and mediation can be undertaken in either an
adversarial or collaborative manner. Other authors include legislation and administrative
procedures as additional alternatives.!^ These authors tend to examine and interpret
litigation and otha" formal political processes as alternatives that often fail to settle disputes
satisfactorily. They are acknowledged as an important part o f the political context in which
decisions are made, and then assigned to the background as other alternatives are discussed
more thoroughly.
The main problem with litigation is the frequency with which it produces long,
expensive battles, but little in the way o f satisfactory solutions. Attorneys are usually
expensive, especially if a case continues for several years. Problems go unsolved while
decisions hang in court and money disappears. Social costs of litigation accrue as time.

Bacow and Wheeler (1984).
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987); Crowfoot and Wondolleck (1990).
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energy, and money are spent on litigation rather than more constructive projects. Prolonged
non-decision can have serious consequences. In resource disputes, development projects
may be interrupted indefinitely and environmental degradation may continue or worsen.
The costs o f litigation — economic, social, and environmental — are substantial. This
supports the rationality of choosing to try other methods of dispute resolution.
Another problem with litigation is the tendency o f issues to be resolved on narrow
legal points that have little to do with the issues in dispute. Litigation may be used
strategically for a variety of ends, such as buying time, putting fear into the adversary, and
generating public issues and awareness. As a means of problem-solving and decision
making, however, its merits are not compelling. In most cases the issues in dispute are not
identical to the narrow, legal, procedural points on which the cases are d e c i d e d . T h e
odds of coming up with a good solution when basic problems haven't been clarified and
considered are not good. Cases are often decided on arbitrary grounds. When underlying
issues are not resolved, conflict continues to tear away at the social fabric, often resurfacing
in appellate court or new cases.
The poor quality of decisions produced by litigation can also be interpreted more
generally as a consequence o f handing difficult decisions over to an outsider to the dispute.
There are advantages and disadvantages to letting an outsider make decisions. A position of
relative neutrality can aiable one to evaluate and interpret disputes without the limiting bias
of having a stake in the outcome, but it can also impede a full understanding of what is at
stake for the several disputants. Such a decision-maker may not understand the situation
well enough to gauge the consequences o f possible decisions accurately. Stakeholders
themselves are in a much better position from which to judge whether a decision is
satisfactory and what consequences it is likely to generate. At the same time, it is also
20 Bacow and Wheeler (1984).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32
possible that an outsider will not be neutral. These considerations suggest that disputants
would do well to try working things out for themselves before turning the decision over to
others.
An additional problem with litigation, which has perhaps generated the most interest
in alternatives, is the notorious backlog of cases in the nation's court system. Part of this
has resulted from litigation's ineffectiveness in resolving disputes. Because people are
frequently unsatisfied with court decisions, the appellate courts have been overwhelmed.
According to Warren Berger, the larger problem seems to be that, "the courts have been
expected to fill the void created by the decline o f church, family, and neighborhood
unity."21 In other words, it appears that the courts serve as a replacement for other
methods o f decision-making. Although this suggests that the former methods were
somehow unsatisfactory, it is also possible that these have simply been lost as a result of
being undermined by the relatively greater authority o f court decisions. In the latter case,
the courts are turned to for lack o f alternatives. Berger's position is that in many cases the
courts are a poor substitute for the institutions they have r e p l a c e d . 2 2 For reasons similar to
those given above —namely, the narrow bases of court decisions —alternative methods of
decision making are more appropriate fOT many disputes.
The inclusion o f litigation and legislation as alternatives helps rationalize and
contextualize the other methods. It causes them to be characterized as alternatives, or valid
substitutions, for more structured institutionalized procedures. Dispute resolution theory
and practice is primarily concerned with alternatives to litigation and other conventional
political

p ro c e d u re s .2 3

The other standard alternatives — arbitration, negotiation and

21 Berger (1982), p. 2.
22 This was echoed with a twist in a statement by Chief Justice Reinquist in February 1992
(National Public Radio Segment). Reinquist announced that the judicial system is being
abused, suggesting that appellants are to blame.
23 The synonym "alternative dispute resolution" expresses this more eloquently.
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mediation — can also be criticized for various shortcomings. The choice between
alternatives is not black and white. Each process has strengths and weaknesses that make it
more or less suited for specific disputes. Arbitration, for example, is an adversarial
process, but still has some advantages over litigation. It is less expensive than litigation and
arbitrators have more flexibility than judges to consider underlying issues. It also allows
for confidentiality and selection of the arbitrator by disputants.^^ For these reasons it is
often recommended as an alternative to litigation.
Arbitration, however, also shares many o f the shortcomings o f litigation. There is
no guarantee that underlying issues will be represented by disputants or addressed by the
arbitrator. Although arbitrators are not as constrained by narrow legal issues, adversarial
positioning and personal biases may stiU obstruct a full exploration o f disputed issues and
the more informed decisions that could result from this. Moreover, confidentiality and
selection of the arbitrator can cut both ways in environmental disputes. Confidentiality is
good when it provides an atmosphere in which people are willing to talk more openly, but
it can also be used to cover up information that more people should be aware of; for
example, contamination of a watershed. Similarly, selection o f an arbitrator can be
advantageous if it means providing someone who understands environmental science, but it
can just as easily allow the selection of an arbitrator whose values and priorities are partial
to one o f the parties, possibly to the detriment of biological communities. Also, since the
decision is made by the arbitrator, disputants may not take ownership of decisions with
which they are not satisfied.
In contrast, negotiation and mediation share the advantages of arbitration, but allow
disputants to participate directly in the decision-making process. Because decisions reflect
agreements rather than third party rulings, disputants are more likely to take ownership of
24 Berger (1982), pp. 5 - 6 .
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them. Direct participation also provides an opportunity for underlying issues to come to the
surface. At the same time, however, participation can be very time consuming and may not
be cooperative. Adversarial bargaining strategies are frequently embraced as the key to
success in negotiated decisions. Exaggerated demands, disruptive bargaining strategies,
and even threats can be used to manipulate the process in one's own favor. The frequently
competitive nature of negotiations often leads to decisions in which one party gains at the
expense of another. The shortcomings o f adversarial negotiations have generated
considerable academic and professional interest in the problem of how to get competing
negotiators to cooperate.^^
When the parties in negotiation or mediation collaborate, there is an opportunity to
define issues more clearly by casting off obfuscating strategies. They may then undertake
to explore alternative solutions that would satisfy the needs of all. But although this sounds
ideal, there are still shortcomings. These are basic problems o f democracy. There is no
guarantee that the decision agreed upon is really the best decision possible. With respect to
environmental conflicts this may be due to a lack o f expert knowledge, or a lack of concern
for the common good or the community at large. Such deficiencies may lead to agreements
that just won't work in the long run, or that do work, but only at the expense of others not
included in the p r o c e s s .2 6 And again, collaboration may never be achieved.
More Stalemate. The need for collaborative decision-making procedures is also
based on the growing frequency with which entrenched disputes are preventing plans and
policies from being implemented. Here the major focus is on resource agencies, public

25 Andes (1985), p. 17.
26 This was a basic problem in the Lolo Accords attempted mediation; key interest groups
were unrepresented at the table and eventually opposed the agreement.
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decision-making, and the problems that stem from the political stalemates that bring these
agencies to a halt.
Susskind and Cruikshank rationalize collaborative methods by arguing that many
standard institutions of our political system are poorly adapted to solving many disputes.
To substantiate this, they point to the familiar paralysis of the public sector; nothing getting
done because the available channels to appeal and overturn decisions are being exploited
very effectively by parties that aren't satisfied by public decisions. This is attributed to five
basic flaws of our political system that "foster and prolong" disputes; tyranny o f the
majority, short-term political commitment, the inadequacies o f the voting process, today’s
technical complexities, and the emphasis on winner-takes-all solutions.^^ In general, these
tend to produce "all or nothing" decisions which are based more on popular slogans than
understanding of complex issues, and tend to silence and ignore legitimate minority claims.
At the same time, channels for appeal often allow minorities to obstruct implementation of
the decisions that offend them.
These criticisms are echoed in more abstract terms by Kenneth Barber, who
critiques liberalism via the metaphor o f Newtonian physics. Barber describes a "Newtonian
politics" based on assumptions about human nature that inform a particulate model of
human interaction.^^ The resulting picture o f atomic individuals bouncing blindly into one
another according to physical laws of self-interest is a representation of the chaotic method
o f decision-making. Barber suggests that the shortcomings of our political institutions can
be traced to the narrow and limiting mechanistic understanding of the political species on
which they are based. Rather than understanding humans as communal, social creatures
living in the midst o f relationships and interdependence, prevailing theories have described

27 Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), pp. 38 - 39.
28 Barber, Kenneth (1984).
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us as discrete individuals prone to conflict and dependent on coercive central authority to
keep the peace.^9 Resulting institutions based on the rights of individuals reinforce and
legitim ate this characterization and treat disputes as contests between individuals.
Collaboration, meanwhile, is often precluded as something which is beyond our abilities.
Barber suggests that we need a community oriented understanding of ourselves in order to
arrive at a community oriented politics, or one that looks to the common good and seeks
consensus.
In general, the idea o f the common good, or the good of the community, separates
collaborative from adversarial alternatives. Reaching agreements which include and
reconcile the interests o f many disputants allows decisions to be made in common.
Procedures that have this goal imply that the political species is capable o f sorting out
individual differences and making decisions as interactive and interdependent members of a
community. By these means, minorities and the weaker-positioned in general can be
included in decision-making rather than sacrificed for political expediency. At the same
time, the communal quality of interdependence is not limited to human communities, but
also describes ecological com m unities. By reinforcing aw areness o f human
interdependence, collaborative practices may also remind us o f our place in a larger,
interactive community.
Tragedy o f th e Commons. Concern for the common good is critical in the
collective use o f any limited resource. The general paradigm of these situations is the
problem set out by Garrett Hardin as the "tragedy o f the com m ons."^ The tragedy occurs
when a resource, such as a grazing field or even a library, is shared by a number o f people

29 Hobbes comes to mind here as providing the seminal description of the human potential
without coercive authority —life would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short!
30 Hardin (1968), pp. 1243 - 1248. The Tragedy o f the Commons is a model of human
behavior based on game theory and rational choice theories of sociology.
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who act on the basis of immediate self-interest If everyone follows the rule o f self-interest,
common property is invariably destroyed. Although Hardin used this model to argue for
privatization, it can also be used as an argument against narrow self-interest.
In the case o f an unregulated library, the tragedy occurs if everyone chooses to keep
library books instead o f returning them. If we consider self-interest in terms of access to
books, then keeping a book is a positive value which involves no loss in access to the
library's other books. If everyone reasons this way, the library will soon be gone.
Similarly, in the case o f a common grazing field, adding animals beyond the field's
capacity detracts from the value of every animal in the field. But since this decrease in value
is spread out over the entire herd, the individual who adds more animals still comes out
ahead.^i Since every stockowner on the commons has a similar a positive incentive to add
to the herd, tragedy ensues because the limited resource is inevitably used up.
The tragedy o f the commons is a model, or pattern, o f a destructive situation. It
demonstrates that exploitive values and limited resources do not mix well. It does not
establish that self-interested values are right or wrong, but simply shows how they become
self-destructive when resources are limited. Presuming that self-destruction is not the
intended end, we could say that these values and their associated actions are poorly
informed or shortsighted. On a shrinking planet where self-interest is the prevailing
philosophy, shortsightedness is not the cutting edge o f survival, but the cutting off o f
survival. Instead, we need to be aware o f our interdependence and its consequences.

That is, supposing that 10 stock growers with 10 head apiece share a field that has the
capacity to support 100 head, then all of the animals grow to their full size and bring the
maximum price when sold. If one stockgrower doubles his herd, we then have 110 animals
on a field that only supports 100. As a result, each animals food supply and weight is
reduced by about a tenth, and their value drops accordingly. Thus overgrazing reduces the
value of each animal. The guy with 20 head stiU comes out ahead though, since twenty
times the reduced value is greater than ten times the fuU value.
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This paradigm applies to other common resources such as public lands, air and
water with similar consequences. Its key assumption is that people will act in accordance
with rational self-interest. The tragedy can be avoided if an understanding o f the problem
posed by many self-interests leads to a different perception o f self-interest and a change in
b e h a v io r .^ 2

incidentally, considering the consequences o f many self-interests is similar to

Kant's mechanistic approach to morality. He argues that one should only will such actions
that could be willed universally. Thus the logical step that can avert the tragedy is not
foreign to the culture o f mechanistic science. By recognizing the limitations inherent in the
system and universalizing immediate self-interest, the tragedy can be foreseen and so
avoided.
This method o f respecting the common good, however, is problematic insofar as it
circumvents interaction. This is a quality of rational choice theories in general, which
inform both Hardin's and Kant's formulas. In general, these theories rest on postulates of
human motivation. The tragedy o f the commons model, like our liberal institutions, is
based on the postulate that humans are motivated by narrow self-interest. The model just
applies this to a given situation and extrapolates the consequences. Ultimately, this reveals
more about the consequences o f a certain set o f assumptions than it addresses real
situations. Postulating that humans are motivated by narrow self-interest asserts that certain
values are universal. This is a big assumption, and one which contradicts an alternative
assumption that people and situations are unique.
Collaborative methods o f decision-making are recommended by concern for the
commons. The degradation o f the waterways in Upper Clark Fork Basin is a prime
example of what can happen when narrow interests take precedence over concern for the
larger systems and communities within which they are pursued. The question is how to
32 The problem is also avoided, or at least obscured, if people do not act rationally.
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resolve opposing interpretations o f what is in the community's interest. This involves
reconciling the differences between individual values and priorities.^^ While assuming that
some values are universal would simplify these differences, it does so by burying them
under an assumption. In contrast, collaboration lets different individuals speak for
themselves, allowing community interests to reflect those o f its members, rather than
rational assumptions.
The significance o f value differences can be seen in the Upper Clark Fork dispute.
Although ranchers and environmentalists may agree that the river is in bad shape, and even
that irrigation contributes to this, the two groups evaluate these facts differently. The issue
o f what to do about the Basin’s fishery is not just a technical problem, but involves a
conflict of interests, or values. When disagreements are of this nature, it is unlikely that any
method o f problem-solving that circumvents direct interaction will come up with real
solutions. It is doubtful that anyone can represent the priorities, values and attitudes of
another person as well as the unique individual that they belong to. In view o f this, it
makes sense that community members should represent themselves and engage in a
dialogue that will enable them to understand and reconcile their own differences.
Ultimately, the commons becomes threatened because we ignore it; we ignore our
interdependence. The problem is not that we fail to subscribe to Kantian or Hardinian
formulas. Because formulas and rationalized systems constructed on this basis do little to
restore attention to our surroundings, their contribution should not be overestimated. The
cultural values and institutions that encourage us to think of ourselves as discrete
individuals, rugged or selfish, distract us from thinking o f what we share and hold in
common. This suggests that we need institutions that recognize our interdependence and

33 Bacow and Wheeler (1984), p. 10.
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draw attention to our mutual dependence on the landscape we share. Collaborative methods
of decision-making have this potential.
Such approaches could also help resolve environmental conflicts not directly
described by the logic o f the commons. This includes occasions when community decision
making is complicated by property rights and dispositions favoring economic growth.
Repeatedly we hear the argument that people need jobs and communities need economic
development, often of the extractive industrial kind. But however persuasive, it is not true
that industrial development is good without q ualification.^ '^ In actuality, it can produce a
myriad o f unanticipated problems. A sudden increase in population, increases in inflation
and a greater demand for public services are examples o f the changes development brings
to a rapidly growing community.^^ This indicates that the community would be wise to
consider more than money when choosing to undertake industrial development and its
consequences. Supposing that developers will be disproportionately influenced by potential
profits, broadening the basis o f such decisions would seem to hinge on broadening
community involvement in making them.
It is clear that economic development reaches beyond the developer and affects the
entire community. From this standpoint it seems obvious that the entire community should
participate in the question o f whether and how to undertake and manage such development
This, however, is rare. The sanctified institution o f private property effectively obscures
this common sense in most instances. Even when a local zoning process provides an
opportunity for some involvement, input seldom goes beyond the concerns o f immediate
neighbors and yea or nay opinions. Citizens who offer lengthier analyses of these
questions are rare, and hearings often do little more than testify to the demand for job
Thomas Power’s book, TTte Economic Pursuit o f Quality, discusses this in more detail.
This is illustrated elegantly in the film. Heartland, produced by Northern Plains
Resource Council.
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availability. Meanwhile, there are often ways to avoid zoning restrictions if a developer is
determined to go through with a

p r o je c t.^ ^

Developing beyond city limits on private land,

is one way to avoid the concerns o f other local citizens,^^
In many places there appears to be a lack of concern for whole communities and
lack of respect between the individuals who share them. More precisely, we often do not
"share" them at all, but simply take what we can get. The consequences of this on our
neighbors is their problem. It is up to them to compete in turn to get what they can.
W hoever gets the most wins! This goes for human communities as well as the larger
ecological communities. Unfortunately, this prevailing attitude will make us all losers in the
long run. On the one hand it allows the human community to become a place o f winners
and losers, o f haves and have-nots, which can generate despair and violence; the brutality
of the philosophy may be reproduced with a vengeance by the disadvantaged. At the same
time, the existing stock o f stuff to compete for is bound to run out. In other words, the
resource base is used up, degraded, destroyed.
N atural Selection. Squinting back into the misty could-be's o f prim ordial
human society, there is room to speculate fruitfully on the role of collaboration in our
development as a social species. Employing a basic Darwinian-M endelian view of
evolution based on natural selection, it is possible that under the right natural conditions,
successful means o f resolving conflict have been a boon to human communities. Group
hunting methods, for example, which were virtually necessary for hunting massive game
like mammoth or bison, required humans to work together. Speculating still further, it is
possible that our use o f language developed as a way to reduce conflict by establishing
^ Landman ( 1985) discusses this with regard to the ineffectiveness of Montana's
subdivision law.
In some cases, county restrictions prevent this; eg, Ross Electric's effort to build a toxic
waste incinerator outside the city limits of Missoula, MT, was stopped by a county
prohibition of waste burning throughout the larger Missoula Valley.
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agreements. Communication can contribute to the coordination o f a group, or its ability to
work together.
While this is mere speculation, the accuracy o f which is ultimately hidden in the
mists o f unrecorded history, it is a relevant analogy to our modern environmental and
evolutionary crises, both local and worldwide. The current rate of environm ental
degradation and species loss is threatening the biosphere and the future survival o f species,
possibly including ourselves. This is a situation where successful collaboration could be an
evolutionary advantage. In other words, it may be time to remember communal origins and
the wisdom of ancestors.
Numerous actions that could be taken to relieve these crises are impeded by
environmental and development conflicts around the world. From the international level to
the local level, entrenched disputes are preventing critical solutions from coming forth. The
causes o f these disputes are very complex and case specific, but they are sim ilar as
stalemates. Their entrenched characteristic stands in the way o f settlement and solutions.
Supposing that the doom and gloom crowd is right —that our large-scale modelling efforts
are in the right ball park in indicating that time is running out if we intend to keep this planet
inhabitable —something needs to be done soon. In this light, the continued evolution o f our
species and cultures and the other remaining species on the planet is a rationale for dispute
resolution.
Much o f this comes down to an assessment o f risk and our w illingness to
compromise in order to avert disaster. There are valid concerns on both sides here as to the
need for compromise. On the one hand, development advocates may not be persuaded that
the biosphere or even any o f its subsystems are really threatened. In this case, compromise
suggests throwing away profits and power to satisfy a bunch of evangelistic humanists and
eco-granolas. On the other hand, many environmental advocates feel that the biosphere has

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43
already suffered too much and that compromise means continuing the damage, but only at a
slightly slower rate. In this case, degradation will continue as new agreements succeed only
in delaying somewhat our immanent self-destruction. The value o f collaboration and the
possibility of mutually beneficial compromise is contested on both sides.
While there is no guarantee that negotiated solutions to these conflicts will work, or
even if they do manage to produce agreements, that these will avert our self-destruction, it
still stands to reason that an endless standoff solves nothing. Despite the lack o f
guarantees, it stands to reason that beginning to talk about our differences and
understanding one another's needs and the needs o f the planet is a first step towards
figuring out what to do. Communication is our best hope at reaching agreements that will
get us through these crises.
Given the shortcomings of conventional decision-making procedures, it makes
sense to seek alternatives. Given the community stake in landscape decisions, it makes
sense to seek community-oriented alternatives that rqplace discrete interests with interactive
agreements. As local landscapes and the earth's biosphere are being destroyed, indecision
serves no one.
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III. Collaboration
If we're ever going to quit reliving that story we have to start talking
things out, searching for accord, however difficult and long-winded the
undertaking. We need to see that adversarial, winner-take-all, showdown
political decision-making is a way we defeat ourselves. Our future starts
when we begin honoring the dreams o f our enemies while staying true to
our own.38
-William Kittredge, 1992

The assertion that collaborative methods o f decision-making offer a viable alter
native to adversarial struggles and entrenched disputes requires substantiation. Disputants
who are frustrated with adversarial procedures and feel that they are accomplishing very
little may well agree that there ought to be a better way to make decisions. But unless this
better way is understood and accessible, disputants have little choice but to persevere with
their struggles. It is fine to point out problems with adversarial attitudes and non-decision,
but until an alternative is offered, such criticism lacks the force to bring ^aout change. This
chapter describes collaborative procedures and considers how they are being implemented
in Upper Clark Fork Basin.
Collaborative M ethods. Collaborative methods have been introduced as a
community-oriented approach to decision-making — a way to transform discrete and
conflicting interests into an agreed-upon estimate of the common good. W here cultural
values and institutions are adversarial, however, collaboration can be difficult to
im plem ent In Upper Clark Fork Basin, individualism has strong roots in the Western
mythos o f rugged independence and in institutions such as property rights and watCT rights.
As noted earlier, transformation o f the landscape has come about in a predominantly chaotic
manner and has led to adversarial disputes. This history supports and validates an

38 Kittredge (1992); p. 12.
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adversarial orientation to dispute settlement. As a result, efforts to get disputants to
collaborate must often overcome this adversarial orientation.
Getting away from adversarial struggles can be a formidable task, especially when
disputes are entrenched and impassioned. When embroiled in conflict, the political species
often becomes suspicious and defensive. At such times, even the most well-intended
efforts to promote cooperation can be seen as malicious attempts to build trust that wÜl only
be taken advantage of later. Under these conditions, collaboration seems unlikely. It may
yet be fostered, however, with the aid of dispute resolution theory and practice.
Formalized collaborative procedures can be thought o f as tools for moving
adversarial disputants toward more collaborative problem solving relationships. A variety
o f frameworks and model procedures are available, enabling would-be collaborators to
select whichever is best suited to a specific dispute. Because disputes are context specific
and vary in many respects, there is no simple formula for resolving them. The various
collaborative models are processes that can be introduced and followed in specific
situations. They provide series o f procedural steps that can be taken to move away from
adversarial struggle toward agreement.
In Getting to Yes, Roger Fisher and William Ury present a form o f negotiation
called "principled negotiation," or "negotiation on the merits." This approach to
collaboration is based on an analysis of positional bargaining, in which disputants take hard
or soft bargaining strategies to get what they want. According to the authors, the problem
with positional bargaining is twofold. On the one hand, when hard positions are taken,
adversarial stalemates develop. These are struggles to dominate, or gain the upper position.
But on the other hand, if soft positions are taken, the quality of agreements tends to suffer.
Soft positions are oriented toward reaching agreements and preserving cooperation at all
costs. If all disputants take soft positions, difficult issues may be glossed over or avoided
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entirely, possibly leaving them to erupt again later. Meanwhile, if disputants are divided
between hard and soft positions, hard positions dominate.
Based on their analysis, Fisher and Ury suggest that every dispute has two aspects
“ the relationship o f the disputants and the substance o f the dispute. Principled negotiation
is based on recognizing both o f these aspects and dealing with them separately. On the one
hand, disputants are human beings with valid emotions. These can get tangled up with and
obscure substantive issues. By airing these feelings and recognizing their validity, the
authors maintain, the disputants can gain a new perspective that enables them to address the
substantive issues o f their dispute more objectively. Participants can "come to see
themselves as working side by side, attacking the problem, not each other.
From this standpoint, the struggle to dominate develops and intensifies when
adversaries identify themselves with their positions. Changing positions becomes a matter
o f self-sacrifice, or an unacceptable admission o f weakness or inferiority. Under these
conditions, negotiation is reduced to a battle between wills, which effectively obstructs
constructive problem solving.^! Fisher's and Ury's framework for dealing with this
situation includes four general propositions, or rules; (1) separate the people from the
problem, (2) focus on interests, not positions, (3) generate a variety o f possibilities before
deciding what to do, and (4) insist that the result be based on some objective standard.
These rules are designed to help negotiators replace the battle o f wills with a reasoned
discussion o f interests, options and criteria.'*^
In general, this approach to collaboration seems both theoretically sound and easy
to follow. Its simplicity, however, may be illusory. The four simple rules given here

39 Fisher and Ury (1981), pp. 3 - 14.
40 Ibid, p. 11.
41 Ibid, pp. 84 - 85.
42 Ibid, pp. 1 1 - 1 4 .
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represent tasks that can be quite difficult to carry off in practice. Although a negotiator can
try to follow these rules and recommend them to the other parties, adversarial attitudes may
still prevail. Anticipating this, the authors offer some additional suggestions; namely,
maintain a strong position by developing alternatives to reaching agreement, refuse to fall
back into positioning no matter what the others do^^, and try to lay down ground rules at
the beginning o f the negotiation.*^ Although collaboration may still be difficult to achieve
depending on the particulars o f a dispute and its disputants, these rules and suggestions
provide an idea of how to proceed. Together with the analysis on which they are based,
these precepts constitute a loose framework for understanding and changing the dynamics
of adversarial situations.
Susskind and Cruikshank provide a somewhat different framework. They present a
spectrum o f collaborative methods which vary according to the degree o f outside
intervention, or procedural assistance, that they entail. The range of alternatives includes
unassisted negotiation and several shades o f assisted negotiation —facilitation, mediation,
and less common procedures, such as mock trials.*^^ Each o f these methods is described as
involving a similar series o f procedural steps. The methods vary in terms of how much
assistance is provided to help disputants keep in step.
In unassisted negotiation, as one might expect, disputants must take these steps for
themselves. Fisher and Ury's ftamework provides one way they might do this. In contrast,
Susskind and Cruikshank present a time sequence o f steps to follow in order to arrive at
consensus. W here Fisher and Ury dealt only with negotiation, these authors address a
larger process which they divide into three phases — prenegotiation, negotiation, and
postnegotiation.
^3 "Negotiation Jujitsu"
44 Fisher and Ury (1981), pp. 101 - 149.
45 Susskind and Cruikshank (1987). Chapters 4 and 5 discuss these in detail.
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Prenegotiation includes four steps — making contacts and learning about the
dispute, determining who should participate and getting them or their representatives to the
table, developing ground rules and an agenda, and engaging participants in joint fact
finding in order to generate a common basis o f knowledge from which to negotiate. The
inclusion o f ground rules and joint fact-finding in the prenegotiation phase suggests that
these steps are to be approached as technical matters to be settled prior to bargaining. This
is a notable divergence from Fishe* and Ury, who treated these steps as part of negotiation.
By framing these steps as part o f prenegotiation, Susskind and Cruikshank may help to
isolate them from from the throes o f positioning. That is, this conceptual framework seems
to encourage disputants to engage in developing ground rules and fact-finding in a more
business-like, or principled manner than they might otherwise. This may allow critical parts
of the negotiation, its rules and foundation, to be developed with a minimum of conflict.
The negotiation phase begins by inventing options for mutual gain. These are then
packaged, or combined, into agreements that are acceptable to all parties. This sequence
adheres to the rule o f generating options before deciding what to do. While negotiation
might be expected to end once an z^reement is reached, Susskind and Cruikshank include
three more steps —producing a written agreement, developing provisions that will ensure
the parties’ accountability to the agreement, and ratification of agreements by represented
groups. These additional steps help ensure that hard-won agreements will both last long
enough and have the support to be implemented. Postnegotiation follows up on this by
formalizing agreements, monitoring implementation, and providing for renegotiation in the
event that unforeseen circumstances should make this necessary or desirable.
In general, this series o f steps provides a considerably different framework for
problem solving than Fisher's and Ury’s general rules. The step-by-step approach is more
structured. It also draws attention to the process of consensus building by defining it more
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exactly. Fisher and Ury were more concerned with qualities o f negotiation than providing a
detailed analysis o f the collaborative process. In contrast, Susskind and Cruikshank appear
to be more concerned with clarifying and designing an orderly and comprehensive process
than encouraging their readers to speculate on the root causes o f adversarial behavior.
IntCTestingly, this may help separate the people from the problem. That is, by focussing on
process rather than ego warfare, we are less inclined to view adversaries within an us-andthem framework. When it comes time to p^suade disputants that collaboration is worth a
try, the merits o f a process may be easier for them to appreciate than the propriety o f
individual attitudes and behavior.
While unassisted negotiation leaves disputants to follow these steps on their own, a
facilitator can provide them with lim ited assistance. According to Susskind and
Cruikshank, a "facilitator" is an intervener whose influence on the negotiation is limited to
procedural matters, such as proposing ground rules and keeping the discussion in line with
agendas. These authors distinguish procedural considerations from substantive issues
much as Fisher and Ury distinguished relationships from the substance of disputes. The
issue o f how to proceed is largely a matter o f structuring and guiding the interaction of
disputants to render it as constructive as possible. In other words, a facilitator manipulates
the disputants' relationship in order to keep them focussed on solving the problem rather
than taking hard positions or wandering off on tangents.
In mediation, meanwhile, the intervener influences both substantive and procedural
matters. This becomes desirable when procedural intervention alone is not enough to
generate agreements. When disputants are too entrenched in their positions to communicate
constructively, a mediator can sometimes act as a go between. By discussing issues with
the various parties separately, a mediator may be able to identify options and develop
mutually beneficial packages. These can then be proposed to the disputants and modified

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50
until an agreement is reached. By making proposals and developing options, the mediator
is influencing substantive issues as well as the process.
More innovative methods are also available. Mock trials are basically just what they
sound like. By simulating a trial, disputants can sometimes get a better understanding o f the
relative strength of their positions while at the same time generating possible solutions. The
mock decisions generated in such trials are potential solutions to the dispute, which can be
accepted or rejected by the participants. Another innovative method, proposed elsewhere by
W illiam Fulton, is "design-oriented negotiation."*^^ This is an approach to land-use
planning that m akes use o f extrem e project designs to literally illustrate the
unreasonableness of some positions. A neutral designer-facilitator helps the disputants
agree on some basic parameters of the project design and then takes these and develops
several alternative extreme interpretations of the requirements. Once illustrated, extreme
positions become harder to defend, making mutually agreeable alternatives easier to
identify.
It is noteworthy that Susskind and Cruikshank differentiate collaborative methods
according to the degree o f assistance or intervention that they afford negotiators. The
degree of outside intervention is emphasized because of its influence on whether disputants
are willing to take ownership o f decisions. Ownership o f decisions hinges on whether
decisions are accepted voluntarily or imposed by higher authorities and/or more powerful
parties. Based on their analysis o f public disputes, the authors maintain that dissatisfaction
with imposed decisions is a primary cause of prolonged public disputes. Dissatisfaction
with decisions impedes ownership, without which parties may impede implementation to
the best o f their abilities.^^ Avoiding this requires that decisions are mutually satisfactory

46 Fulton (1989).
47 Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), Chapter 3.
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and voluntarily accepted by all parties. This can be ensured by allowing participants to
determine the content o f decisions for themselves. Because intervention detracts from the
disputants' influence on decisions, the best method to use in any situation is that which
involves the least intervention.^*
Given this range o f collaborative methods, it appears that disputants have some
options in addition to adversarial struggle. Step-by-step procedural frameworks and other
conceptual guidelines bring collaboration closer to reality by helping us understand how it
works and providing a starting point and a path to follow in the event that someone wants
to give it a try."^^ Although there is no guarantee that disputants will choose to try
collaboration, elucidation o f these procedures at least provides them with a choice. But
because the understanding afforded by frameworks and models is largely theoretical, many
potential collaborators may not be persuaded that they really work. As long as these
alternatives are left drifting in the realm o f abstract analysis, without concrete examples,
their viability remains dubious. Experience is more persuasive than theoretical models. In
view o f this, there is reason to consider the practice o f collaboration in terms of its
applicability to specific disputes.
The Committee. The Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Com mittee is
attempting to resolve an entrenched dispute via collaboration. Because the Committee is still
at an early stage o f its endeavor to develop a com prehensive plan for the Basin’s
waterways, it cannot serve as a demonstration o f successful collaboration. It does,
however, provide some examples o f how theories o f collaboration translate into the realm
o f practice.
Ibid, Chapter 5.
Other step-by-step approaches are laid out by McCarthy and Shorett (1984) in Nego
tiating Settlements, and by Crowfoot and Wondolleck ( 1990) in Environmental Dispute
Resolution. These are similar to those discussed, but offer some additional insights and
suggestions on how to proceed.
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The Committee is an example of facilitation. Although DNRC is responsible for
coordinating basin committees under the State Water Plan, the facilitation of this committee
is being paid for and implemented by a private, non-profit organization; Northern Lights
Research and Education Institute, located in Missoula. This organization also sponsored the
formation and facilitation o f the group that preceded this Committee. The Clark Fork River
Project was undertaken in 1988 when Northern Lights "formed a steering committee
including representatives of the range o f stakeholders in the use and management o f the
river.
In June 1990, this group decided to narrow their focus and form a Water Allocation
Task Force consisting o f representatives o f agricultural, recreational, and environmental
organizations, hydroelectric utilities, state agencies, and local government. The Task Force
soon became entangled in the tension surrounding the two water reservation applications,
and eventually lobbied the legislature to enact a moratorium on issuing water rights and
reservations until a comprehensive plan could be developed. According to the summary of
a presentation at the present Committee's first meeting;
The members o f the Task Force were faced with expense, conflict and risk
arising from a pending contested case water reservation hearing before the
Board o f N atural Resources and Conservation. Although they shared
suspicion and skepticism about doing so, the Task Force decided to attempt
negotiations which might eliminate the need for the hearing. Negotiations
occurred during December 1990 through February 1991, and an agreement,
entitled the Upper Clark Fork River Agreement, was signed in late
February.^ 1
This Agreement provided the prototype for Senate Bill 434, which created the Upper Clark
Fork River Basin Steering Committee. The success o f the Task Force negotiation is an

Northern Lights, "Upper Clark Fork Steering Committee October 28,1991 Meeting
Summary," p. 2.
Ibid, p. 2.
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im portant source o f confidence in the ability o f the new Committee to sort out the
reservation dispute and develop a Basin plan on which all o f its members can agree.
Facilitation. As noted, the facilitation of the Committee is being funded privately.
The idea o f privately funding a state project may seem unusual or even wrong. But when
the responsible agency is not a neutral party, this is recommended by a consideration of the
role o f trust and fairness in the dynamics o f successful negotiation. In this case, the
responsible agency is DNRC.
DNRC oversees water rights and use permits within the Basin and so is in a
position o f authority and control with respect to the Basin’s water users. From the
standpoint of many water users, DNRC is an obstacle to their interests. The principles,
concerns, and interests that guide DNRC in its management decisions sometimes come into
conflict with the interests o f water users. Such conflicts demonstrate that DNRC is not a
neutral party with respect to the use and management o f water within the Basin. Despite the
legal basis o f DNRC’s authority and guidelines, these still constitute an interest in the
Basin's waters. Concern for the possibility that these interests could dominate the planning
committee’s decisions unfairly if DNRC held the purse strings is reason to find outside
funding, or at least set up the fund in such a way that it is isolated from the agency’s
influence.
In addition, the possibility o f political affiliations between various agencies and
interests at the state capitol may arouse suspicion regarding the integrity, or "legal purity,"
of DNRC's interpretation and implementation of its duties within the Basin. State capitols
develop their own political cultures distinguished by local knowledge o f the state’s
channels of political influence. Although some Basin dwellers participate in this in varying
degrees, there is a cultural separation between the Basin and the capitol which can give rise
to distrust, especially on the part o f those with less influence. It is not terribly hard to
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im agine political influence being abused. Regardless o f w hether such distrust, or
suspicion, is well-placed, it may enhance the impression that DNRC should not be trusted
to facilitate neutrally. Judging from casual conversation with some ranchers and water
users in the Philipsburg area, distrust is ju s t the best way to deal with governm ent
authority, whether this means DNRC, FWP, the Forest Service, or the 1RS. Although the
prevalence o f this attitude throughout the Basin is uncertain, its possibility is an additional
reason for outside facilitation and funding. Being able to trust the facilitator is a critical
element of successful facilitation; without this, participants are liable to reject decisions and
ap^ly themselves to obstruction rather than implementation.
The basin committee's facilitator also facilitated Northern Lights' Clark Fork
Project and the subsequent Task Force. Perhaps because Northern Lights has the reputation
o f being an "environmental organization," there has been some resistance to this facilitator
within the Committee. Some members seem to feel that the facilitator may be biased on
behalf of environmental protection and Committee members who advocate such protection.
This manifests itself from time to time, especially when procedural issues are brought up
for the Committee's consideration. In the third meeting, for example, when Committee
ground rules were being considered, a membCT objected to the following proposed rule:
Meetings of the Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee will be
scheduled by the Committee Facilitator pursuant to the Committee's work
plan or the call o f a quorum o f Committee members.^^
The member expressed concern for the range of what might be done in the name of the
"work plan," telling the facilitator that the rule "seems to give you broad powers."^^
Apparently, this member felt that the vaguen^s o f this language might be taken advantage

52 Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee, Ground Rules (January 28, 1992).
53 Bradford, S.; Transcripts of Upper Clark Fork Basin Committee, Meeting #3 (January
30, 1992).
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o f by the facilitator. The rule was modified to specify the Committee's "approved work
plan."
A short time later, at the same meeting, the same member objected to the fact that
the frequency o f Committee meetings was not specified in the Ground Rules, arguing that
meetings could become a burden on "those who aren't paid to be here." Whether this was
meant to single out the facilitator is uncertain. In general, however, agency and company
representatives, as well as the facilitator, attend the meetings as part of their jobs, while
self-employed ranchers must take time off in order to attend. This division suggests that the
objection was motivated partly by concern that frequent meetings might be used to bias the
Com mittee's decisions in favor o f paid members. The objection was discussed and
everyone agreed that frequency o f meetings should be kept flexible but not allowed to
become burdensome. No changes in the Ground Rules were

m a d e . 54

At the end of the Committee's fifth meeting, a similar attitude of distrust came out in
response to the procedural issue o f how to pay for continued facilitation. This came up
because the foundation that sponsored Northern Lights' facilitation of the Clark Fork
Project and the Task Force, decided not to fund the present Committee on grounds that,
since it now has political support within the state, private funding is no longer needed.55
According to DNRC’s minutes of the meeting;
(The facilitator) asked the Committee's approval for Northern Lights to seek
money for their future participation. (A member) explained that he would
just as soon see Northern Lights' participation stop. He had some concerns
regarding Washington Water Power funding the process, and would like to
see where the past money has been spent, and travel funding for committee
members.56

54 Ibid.
55 Committee expenses, including the facilitator, currently lack funding.
55 DNRC, "Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee Minutes - April 15, 1992,"
p. 14.
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In this case, the member's opposition to Northern Lights is expressed unambiguously. He
also suggests that money has been misspent. Both expressions indicate distrust of Northern
Lights and the facilitator. When questioned by other committee members as to the causes of
his suspicion, the member declined to explain. The Committee then voted to support
Northern Lights' continued facilitation and quest for funding — no one voted against
this.^^

Regarding the first two examples, it seems important to observe that the objections
do reflect genuine ambiguities in the text o f the Ground Rules. The vagueness o f "work
plan" and the lack o f specificity regarding the frequency o f meetings, could provide an
opportunity for someone with devious intentions to manipulate the rules to his or her own
advantage. The possibility o f funds being misused when no one is watching is also
feasible. Given the central role and responsibilities o f the facilitator, this position would
seem to be the best from which to manipulate the process. Such are the calculations o f a
suspicious mind; again, it is not terribly hard to imagine power being abused.
In this case, however, the suspicion seems unwarranted. The vast majority of
committee members on both sides seem to have developed a working respect for the
facilitator's integrity as a neutral participant. Eight members o f the Committee also
participated in the Task Force, which explicitly requested that this facilitator be appointed to
guide the Basin Committee.^* The Task Force's success in reaching an agreement speaks
strongly for his competence, while in the meantime, he has done nothing in the context of
the Committee to suggest that he cannot be trusted. In view o f this, the apparent distrust
seems to have more to do with preconceived notions than experience. Although some
members' limited acquaintance with the facilitator and Northern Lights helps explain this.
57 Ibid.
58 Northern Lights, "Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee, October 28,
1991 Meeting Summary."
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the insinuations seem ungrounded and disruptive in view of the facilitator’s demonstrated
character.
In the absence o f trust, a facilitator's success depends prim arily on whether
disputants have sufficient reason or motivation to want an agreement. The decision to
negotiate is usually informed by substantial costs or risks involved in pursuing other
courses o f action. Fisher and Ury deal at some length with the concept of a negotiator's
BATNA — the Best A lternative To a Negotiated A g r e e m e n t . T h e strength o f a
negotiator’s position depends largely on his or her alternatives to negotiation. The more
dependent one is on reaching an agreement, the more likely one is to cooperate. When the
alternatives do not look terribly promising, negotiation starts to look good. In such
situations, agreements can sometimes be reached despite a lack of trust. This is another
important dynamic o f the Basin Committee facilitation.
In this case, the willingness o f the primary disputants to attempt negotiation can be
understood as a consequence of risks involved in letting the Board o f Natural Resources
and Conservation (BNRC) decide their fate. These members seem to be realizing their
mutual dependence in getting w hat they need. On the one hand, the instream flow
reservation applied for by the Department o f Fish, W ildlife and Parks (FWP) might be
granted by BNRC. The final EIS supports this application.^ But without the cooperation
o f ranchers, FW P could encounter serious obstacles to enforcing the reservation's
implementation. The Basin is just too big to monitor every diversion to make sure water
stays in the streams. Meanwhile, Granite County Conservation District and the water users
who would benefit from their reservation application are also in a situation where
cooperation may be their best option.
Fisher and Ury (1981), pp. 104 -1 1 1 .
^ DNRC (1991), Final Environmental Im p ^ t Statementfo r Water Reservation
Applications in the Upper Clark Fork Basin, pp. 9 - 1 6 .
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Ranchers are coming up against economic changes that are affecting the status o f
irrigation as a beneficial water use. Historically, agricultural diversions have been the
number one beneficial use of water in the West, but this is now changing. Hydropower and
recreation are becoming more important by virtue of their greater economic benefits.^*
Because o f this, irrigation is less likely to be favored by BNRC than it would have been in
the past. The fact that the reservation would require the construction o f two new reservoirs
at an estimated cost o f forty million dollars could also deter BNRCs supporL^^ Moreover,
there is no legal basis on which to grant a water reservation to protect one beneficial use
from competing uses. Even if BNRC decides to support these irrigators in their application,
the decision may not hold up in court. W ater reservations are granted on the basis of
demonstrated need. In this case the "need" is to ensure the future development o f additional
irrigation within the Basin. This could be regarded as more o f a preference than a need.
Overall, there is some incentive for irrigators to consider the relative benefits o f a negotiated
agreement. Rather than chancing it with BNRC and possible litigation, the future of
irrigation might fare better if a collaborative relationship is established with the Basin's
other water users.
The extent to which Committee members from the Basin's ranching community
perceive themselves to need an agreement is difficult to gauge. Some members are constant
advocates o f negotiation, while others tend to be disruptive. As an observer, my general
impression is that many ranchers are feeling threatened by the changes happening around
them and the resulting uncertainty that clouds their future. Their habitat is changing and
could be lo st For some, this is cause to start making neighbors out of the hydropower
giants that lurk downstream, while others are ready to fight. In general, these members are
High Country News (1987), pp. 101 - 102.
62 DNRC (1991), pp. 6 - 8. $40 million is DNRC's estimate. GCCD puts the cost near
$17 million.
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divided in their commitment to collaboration. With regard to those who are not committed
or compelled to reaching agreements, the integrity of the process and the facilitator is
critical to the success of the negotiation and ownership of agreements.
R epresentation. The members o f the Committee were selected by the director of
M ontana’s Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC). They include
representatives o f various water using groups and the governmental units that make
decisions affecting them. Represented groups include irrigators, environmental groups,
municipalities, hydropower and mining companies, county commissions, several state
agencies and EPA. The Committee has twenty-one members in all, not counting the
facilitator.
Because the central dispute involves the water reservation applications o f GCD
and FWP, the balance o f representation between these two organizations is important.
Although each o f these organizations has only one representative, many other represented
groups align more naturally with one than the other. In addition to GCD, the Committee
includes several other members who are either irrigators themselves or friendly to them.
These includes three ranchers from Powell and Silver Bow Counties; and representatives of
Granite County Commission; Deer Lodge County Commission; Montana Water Resources
Association; Headwaters RC&D. An additional member from Philipsburg is also likely to
sympathize with these rural interests. Similarly, FW P's efforts to protect the Basin's
fishery and improve water quality tend to be supported by Montana Trout Unlimited; Clark
Fork Coalition; and the City o f Missoula. Hydropower producers, who are also supportive
o f maximizing stream flow, include M ontana Power Company and Washington W ater
Power Company. This makes it GCD 9, FWP 6.
For the remaining members, probable affiliations are somewhat less predictable.
This includes representatives o f ARCO; EPA; DNRC; Montana Department of Health and
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Environmental Sciences (DHES); two members o f the state’s Legislative W ater Policy
Committee; and two members o f the State Water Planning Advisory Committee (SWPAC),
O f these, the regulatory agencies — EPA, DNRC, and DHES —are generally perceived to
favor conservation despite the neutrality o f their public standing. This evens the score to 9
all. In view o f this, the group seems reasonably well-balanced. This adds to the integrity of
the process, which would be compromised if one of two or more adversarial groups had
overwhelming influence on the group's decisions.
Although the Committee is fairly broad based, the represented groups do not
account for everyone with interests in the Basin's water. The membership includes only
those groups whose involvement was considered essential to producing a plan that would
have an adequate support base to be implemented. Some groups conspicuously absent from
the Committee are the other municipalities, Montana Department of Agriculture, the Forest
Service, and a group of concerned citizens/irrigators from the Upper H int Creek area. This
last group expressed a commitment to block the Committee if it interferes in any way with
their federally granted water right.^^ other citizens also lack representation.
The decision to include some groups and not others can be rationalized as a
pragmatic measure to limit the size of the Committee or insulate it from extreme parties who
may not be willing to collaborate. It also raises suspicion, however, regarding whether the
group has been "loaded" one way or another. Since the Director o f DNRC is primarily
responsible for appointing members to the committee, groups having historically poor
relations with DNRC can be expected to regard these omissions with some suspicion.
DNRC's role as an interested party in the Basin's water conflicts contributes to this.

Some UppCT Flint Creek residents presented a letter and made a statement to this effect
at the Committee’s second meeting (December 9,1991).
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Regardless of why the omissions have occurred, it is questionable whether a plan can really
be comprehensive if some interests are not represented.
The Committee has two options for addressing the limitations o f its representation.
First, it can ask the director o f DNRC to appoint additional members. Second, it can
develop its own public participation program to encourage broader involvement.
Appointing new members is useful if the participation o f a specific group is desired.
Supposing this is the case, the committee can recommend this to the Director o f DNRC,
who may then appoint additional members on this basis. Although the Director, Karen
Barclay, has the option o f not cooperating, this seems unlikely. According to her
introductory presentation at the first meeting,
groups that review and approve a basin m a n iem en t plan would be unlikely
to dictate plan provisions against the wishes o f the local water users as
represented by the steering committee.
Although this addresses the plan rather than a request for additional members, and re f^ s to
groups rather than the director herself, one would expect that a similar policy would hold
with respect to the Committee's wishes regarding its own composition. From what can be
gleaned from the notes and transcripts, Ms. Barclay wants to see the committee succeed.
If higher decision making bodies overturn the plans o f basin committees, this stands to
alienate the committees from the government and obstruct the implementation of any plan.
The Committee has also spent some time considering how to involve more of the
public in its efforts. Several suggestions have been made, such as expanding the
Committee's mailing list, holding meetings throughout the Basin, issuing press releases,
surveying the public interest, and including a time for public comment at all meetings. O f
these, only press releases and a public comment period have materialized at this time. A
press release for the second meeting also encouraged broader involvement, quoting Senator
Tom Beck in saying;
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I strongly urge the basin's farmers and ranchers, recreationists, cities and
towns, businesses and industries, environmentalists —all o f us interested in
the management o f the Upper Clark Fork and its tributaries to become
involved with the work of the Com m ittee.^
In addition, there is considerable interest in varying the location o f meetings in order to
make more people aware of their happening and to make them more accessible to different
communities.
The difficulty of involving more people suggests that the Basin Committee is really
not very representative o f the Basin. It may be that most people are simply not interested in
water management. Visiting Philipsburg in March, the staff at the Town Hall hadn’t heard
o f any basin plan and couldn't tell me anything about the water reservation issue except that
it sounded like something the Flint Creek W ater Users would know about. Since
Philipsburg has its water supply pretty much taken care of by two lakes above the town,
water use in the rest of the Basin, apparently, is not a major concern. At Granite County
Court House, the response was about the same. One staff member knew that a Committee
member was reporting to the County Commissioners, but that was all. He gave the
impression that the Commissioners wanted to keep informed, but had no defined interest in
the matter. At the Forest Service Ranger Station, no one knew anything about it.
Later on at the roadhouse, I did meet up with some ranchers who gave me radically
divergent earfuls on what was going on. From the standpoint of one ranching family,
CCD's reservation proposal was really just for the benefit o f more powerful ranchers
downstream. As far as these folks were concerned, irrigation was hurting fish and
overgrazing in the forests was hurting the hunting and driving elk to invade pastures. They
portrayed themselves as some o f the little guys who get walked on by the government and
more powerful stakeholders. In contrast, from the standpoint o f an irrigator, the claims that
fish were being threatened were untrue and put forth as part of a political struggle between
^ Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee Press Release (December 6, 1991).
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FW P and the ranching community. He also didn't think that forty million dollars was too
much o f a price tag for a project that would benefit a handful of ranching families.
In general, the difficulty o f involving more people in the basin committee's project
seems to stem from several causes. Some people are not aware o f water issues or the
Committee's ongoing task. Others are simply not interested. And some feel alienated from
the govemment.^^ Whether the Committee can overcome such difficulties and get people
interested and involved remains to be seen.
In teractio n . The Committee has been described as providing a forum in which
political discourse can come to com plem ent political struggle. Its meetings are an
opportunity for citizens with opposing interests in the Basin's waters and different
perceptions o f what is at stake to come together and interact in a constructive manner.
Ideally, by exchanging information and expressing their different perspectives to one
another, Committee members can reach agreements as to the Basin's problems and limits,
which will in turn allow them to reach agreement on the best possible solutions for all
concerned. By observing Committee meetings, one can gauge whether such constructive
interaction is actually occurring. Transcripts o f the dialogue at meetings also allow some
insight into the qualities o f the members' interaction.
What follows is a segment of the Committee's conversation at an early meeting.
This is included partly to allow readers who have not attended the Committee’s meetings to
form their own interpretation o f them and partly to provide a basis for my own
interpretation of the meetings. Identification o f members has not been included, primarily
due to concern for an ongoing process. Because this takes the language out of context to
some extent, it may detract from a full understanding of the meaning. At the same time.

Such difficulties indicate the separation between the State's political culture and the local
culture.
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however, since familiar identities and organizational affiliations may blind us from noticing
subtler qualities of communication, this may have a positive value as well.
The dialogue represented here took place at the Committee's fourth m eeting.^ The
fourth meeting took place roughly five months into a process that is scheduled to be
completed in thirty-eight months. At the end o f thirty-eight months, the Committee is
supposed to have produced a comprehensive management plan for the river basin. At the
fifth month, it is still in the preliminary stage of becoming acquainted with the condition of
the Basin, becoming acquainted with one another, and identifying issues that may have a
bearing on its overall task.
*

*

*

Facilitator: "The next item is to come up with an agenda for next time. I'd like to suggest
that we start thinking about developing a work plan for ourselves; someone pointed
out last time that we do have a deadline and there is alot to do. That's just my
suggestion; there may be other topics we should look at first. That's for you to
decide. Are there other topics we need to hear about next time?"
Member 1: "I don't have much o f a handle on the agricultural interests in the upper basin as
far as water quality is concerned. And if water quantity is what we re going to be
looking at, I need a better idea o f where that's at, too. I'm not sure what else is
available, but Natural Resources Information System in Helena may have what
we need."
MembCT 2: "I had them prepare a GIS for some Clark Fork sections. They have access to
alot of information but alot o f it hasn't been put together y e t It cost us quite a bit to
have it compiled."

^ Bradford, S.; Transcripts o f Upper Clark Fork Basin Committee, Meeting #4 (March 3,
1992).
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Member 3: "We've had a base map made up and it's pretty good. It would have been here
today but some equipment broke down."
Member 1: "Does it have information on irrigated acres?"
Member 4: "The Ag Statistical Service and the State Extension Sa-vice have a wealth of
information."
Facilitator: "Do you think it's premature to start developing a work plan, then?"
Member 5: "Not necessarily. I think (member A's) got a good idea; getting a better picture
o f existing demands."
Observer 1: "The County Assessors have better information, especially on irrigated acres.
They can tell you what's really going on. If this water reservation goes through,
people are going to lose their water. Fish Wildlife and Parks is gonna make
everyone put in measuring devices."
Member 3: "DNRC has a summary of claims."
Member 4: "I think it's only right to ask individual irrigators. We need to encourage more
participation and get ideas. Maybe a questionnaire would do it"
Facilitator: "Would you be willing to draft a questionnaire for the group?"
Member 4: "Sure, I've got one right here."
Facilitator: "Should we form a committee to draft a questionnaire?"
Member 6: "I think we're getting half a step ahead o f ourselves. I agree with (Member 1)
that a map would help. Some o f us are less familiar with what's going on out there,
what the community is like, what you do when you irrigate. It would help to
visualize it. Who are we talking about? What rights exist?"
Facilitator: "OK, So we need to know the number o f rights, the amount of water being
used, what crops are grown, ...anything else?"
Member 6: "GIS would be a start The irrigators on the committee could give their views."
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Member 2: "Alot of the GIS layers aren't there, but its a good base map. General stuff is
on there; diversions, waterways, geology, transportation corridors."
Member 7: 'W e're talking about initial information, on agriculture?"
Member 6: "And other uses, like municipal."
Member 8: "We've heard from special interests, but not agriculture. A Department of
Agriculture representative would have helped but Director Barclay was opposed.
Before this committee was formed, I made a formal petition to have the Department
o f Agriculture invited and she said it wasn't a stakeholder. Now Ag doesn't want
anything to do with it."
Member 6: "I don't even know how many districts are in the basin. What’s the picture?"
Member 9: "It’s mostly individuals. There's no real organization or anything; everyone
has their own way o f doing things."
Member 10: T h e 1988 Clark Fork Basin Project Action Plan dealt with water quantity to
some extent."
Member 1: "Are there people who could come in?"
Member 8: "The local Soil Conservation Service has stats. DNRC's information is way
off. That report was a good example; the numbers were all wrong; totally different
than what's at the county. W e went to (Official) and said it was wrong —(Official)
looked straight at us and said it didn't matter."
Facilitator: "It sounds like the Conservation Service has some information they could tell us
about."
Member 4: "Bureau o f Reclamation could send someone. "
Member 7: "The Department of Agriculture could come. "
Facilitator: "Then the next meeting should focus on agricultural water use in the basin, and
I should talk to the Ag people here about who to invite?"
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Observer 2: "The whole purpose o f NRIS is to find information. It's the best source
available and I think this is getting off the track,"
Member 5: "Let's get it all on the table; NRIS and other stuff, too."
Facilitator: "OK, we'll start with Ag next time, I would like to get responses to the
question, too —'what are your objectives as part o f this group?’ —just so we're
starting to think about a work plan."
Member 7: "We need to get going on the work plan."
Member 2: "Even with incomplete information, we can start working on it."
Member 11 : "Are there any other federal rights in the basin that we should be aware of?
What about the tribes?"
Facilitator: "They do have rights here, but they say they will only talk to the Compact
Commission; otherwise, they're not interested,"
(group falls süent)
Facilitator: "So I hear two proposals; to spend half a day on agriculture and half a day to
start the work plan."
Member 7: "Only half a day for Ag?"
Facilitator: "Do we need more?"
Member 7: "Well... (laughs) I'm giving you a hard time, but we could probably spend
a whole day on it"
Member 4: "I propose that we write a letter to the Soil Conservation Service asking them to
send a person to inform us. We should write to the State Librarian too."
Member 2: "NRIS can come tell us what they've got at least."
Facilitator: "So we should spend an hour on NRIS, an hour on SCS, and I should talk to
the ag people here and find out who else to invite? Is that OK with everyone? Any
objections?
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(group assents)
*

*

*

This segment of dialogue is included to provide a sense of what goes on at Basin
Committee meetings. Its rambling quality is typical of long meetings with poorly defined
goals. This quality of wandering from one suggestion to the next, may lead one to believe
that very little is being accomplished. But at the end of a long day, confronting the open
ended question of what to do next time, this is to be expected. Options must be generated
and put on the table before decisions can be made. The rambling quality is also typical of
option generation sessions. One might conclude from this that the facilitator is not being
active enough to move things along. But too much guidance at this stage could limit the
Com mittee’s choices when it comes tim e to decide. There must be tim e for many
suggestions and opinions to be heard before inclusive decisions can be made.
In this instance, the facilitator’s role in guiding the process seems minimal. For the
most part, suggestions and comments were allowed to continue until the group fell silent.
Although periodic attempts were made to summarize suggestions and package them into an
agreeable agenda, these were passed over until the discussion reached its natural end. The
facilitator could have pushed them to make a decision sooner, but doing so could have been
perceived as manipulative. Interestingly, this long-windedness took the meeting well past
its scheduled time o f adjournment.^^ Apparently, the status o f agriculture in the Basin was
considered important and interesting enough to keep going despite the long day. This was
an opportunity for ranchers to be in the spotlight and other committee members to express
their interest in understanding the ranching community, which may have had diplomatic
importance as well.

Ibid. Discussion finally wrapped up 30-40 minutes behind schedule.
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It is noteworthy that the facilitator brings up the work plan four times despite the
members' obvious interest in agriculture. In view o f this, his attempts at packaging are
more than summaries o f generated options. He is clearly pushing them to consider the
work plan. Although most members pass on this, he brings it up again at the end o f the
discussion. In view o f this, it could be argued that the facilitator is doing too much to
manipulate the committee's decision. Member 7's objection is framed by a chuckle, but
also reflects some surprise that "work plan" should come up again after so much discussion
of agriculture. In general, committee members seemed to recognize that they were being
manipulated, but took this in stride. Since the procedural importance of developing a work
plan has been acknowledged since the first meeting, the facilitator's manipulation in this
area was acceptable as a procedural intervention. Despite Member 7's objection, the group
was assented to the facilitator's proposal.
This excerpt of the discussion also introduces the variety o f concerns, information,
and perspectives that the Committee's membCTS bring to the table. It shows, for example,
that sources of valid information on irrigation and agriculture within the Basin are the
subject o f some disagreem ent Given that some o f the discussants are adversaries with
regard to the water reservation dispute, it also appears that some constructive interaction is
possible between adversaries.
D isagreem ents. The exhibited disagreement over sources o f valid information
can be thought o f as a potential minor dispute within the dispute. Because some o f the
members are adversaries, dealing effectively with minor disagreements like this is an
important part o f building a collaborative atmosphCTe. Reaching agreements on relatively
minor issues like meeting agendas helps lay a foundation for the more difficult task of
resolving major disputes. Discouraging adversarial behavior also contributes to this
foundation.
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This disagreement over valid sources o f information provides an example o f how
disagreements can be dealt with effectively. In this case, some members have more respect
for the State Library's Natural Resources Information System, while others consider the
County Assessor's Offices or Soil Conservation Service better sources o f information.
Some members even suggest that there is so much variety between individual ranchers and
farmers that the only way to get a realistic picture of what they're doing is to survey the
whole lot of them. While the last suggestion is essentially dropped for lack o f interest, a
dispute over whether to base decisions on state or county information is avoided by the
decision to take both sources into account. By making room for both positions a dispute is
avoided. This is an example of joint fact-finding.
In general, joint fact-finding helps avoid adversarial behavior in two respects. First,
it diverts attention from pending decisions. As long as there is no immediate need to make a
decision about which source of information is better, this can be put in the background
while attention is focussed more fruitfully on technical issues of where to find information
and what resources are available. This gives the disputants the experience of working
together without the pressure o f having to take positions. The technical problems o f fact
finding are easier to attack side-by-side than major issues of dispute. This is an opportunity
for building a collaborative atmosphere, which may render major issues less divisive when
the time comes to confront them. In addition, joint fact-finding also generates a common
base of knowledge that Committee members can refer to when they begin to negotiate.
Agreement on facts is a prerequisite to agreement on their significance. W hen factual
disagreements arise, the only thing to do is look at the evidence and sort it out as a group.
When the technical nature o f information makes it difficult for disputants to wade through,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7 1
this can be addressed by bringing in experts on both sides of the issue and asking them to
explain their disagreement.^^
Developing ground rules for the group is another valuable way to avoid adversarial
outbursts. On the one hand, agreement on ground rules adds confidence to the members
ability to resolve more difficult issues. Ground rules also provide a formal structure that
can be referred to when outbursts and disagreements arise. The Committee developed its
ground rules in the second, third, and fourth meetings. At the second meeting the concept
was introduced, some samples provided and suggestions were made. At the third meeting,
the facilitator provided a draft for discussion and review which continued into the fourth
meeting, at which the rules were agreed to.
The facilitator's leading role in developing these rules may help explain the
objections to some rules which were brought up earlier. This detracted from the members'
influence on an im portant part o f the process. Feeling coopted on something as
fundamental as the ground rules is understandable cause for suspicion and dissatisfaction
with the process. At the same time, the decision to present the Committee with a draft o f
ground rules is also understandable as a way to avoid the time-consuming activity of
developing ground rules from scratch —an activity that diverts energy from the larger task
o f developing a basin plan. Overall, the facilitator’s action appears acceptable since review
and revisions were also encouraged. The Committee did make some revisions and the
standing version was accepted by consensus. The possibility of making more revisions
later was held open in view o f the possibility that future circumstances could make this
desirable.^®

^8 Susskind and Cruikshank (1987) provide an example o f this tactic.
Bradford, S.; Transcript, Meeting #3 (January 30, 1992). A vote o f 3/4 of members
present can change the ground rules.
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In addition to developing ground rules and engaging in fact-finding, collaboration
has also been advocated explicitly by the facilitator and several members. According to the
minutes of the first meeting;
(The facilitator) shared a lesson learned during his experience as a planner:
no matter how technically correct and otherwise well written the plan may
be, it will not amount to much unless it is credible to and supported by those
that would actually implement it. This lesson together with the state water
planning process gauntlet which the plan must run before it receives any
legal recognition means that the plan will likely fail if it seeks to force any
action on an unwilling interest in the basin. By working together, however,
the basin's water users represented by and through the Committee - instead
o f state and/or federal bureaucrats - can jointly pursue resolution o f issues
and mutual goals regarding use of the waters o f the Upper Clark Fork.^0
This statement and other affirmations of confidence in the Committee's ability to work
together and reach agreements helps create an atmosphere in which collaboration is
expected.
Some members have also acted as facilitators at difficult junctures in the discussion.
At the fourth meeting, during the discussion following a presentation on the Clean W ater
Act, adversarial attitudes erupted between the presenter and some observers and members.
Some members started arguing with the presenter about the costs of implementing the Act
and the effects it would have on local industry. As the exchange increased in volume, one
observer exclaimed that the Act would put an end to all economic development and
demanded an economic impact statement At tiiis point, another committee member broke in
with the firmly spoken rem inder, "We need to be polite. Jim is here to inform, not
advocate." The disruption then subsided.^^ This shows how members can contribute to the
task o f facilitation by acting as co-facilitators. Avoiding adversarial outbursts is easier when
participants share responsibility for maintaining a constructive process.

Northern lights, "Upper Clark Fork Steering Committee, October 28,1991 Meeting
Summary."
Bradford, S.; Transcripts, meeting #4 (March 3, 1992).
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In general, then, there are several things that can be done to prevent disagreements
from becoming an obstacle to negotiation. Joint fact-finding, developing ground rules,
advocacy, and intervention all contribute to promoting a collaborative environment. With
the help o f this simple tool kit, even adversaries can begin working together. Here it should
be noted that these tools can be used throughout the process and not just as a way to set the
stage for collaboration. Because the Basin Committee is still at the early stages of
negotiation, tools fixing adversarial kinks in the process have not yet been needed beyond
these. The Committee cannot provide an example o f how these and additional tools might
be used under the pressure o f difficult decisions.
Inform atio n Base. At this early stage of its development, the Committee's main
task is becoming acquainted with the overall condition o f the basin and various local water
issues. Some initial development o f the work plan at the first two meetings generated a list
of the Committee's information needs.^2 The initial list included basic knowledge on water
law, physical water availability, water use data, fish and wildlife needs, and water quality/
Superfund concerns.^3
Because most o f this information is fairly technical, the method o f becoming
informed has been to invite local experts to give presentations and answer questions. So far
the Committee has heard presentations on water law, water quality standards, the Berkeley
Pit, public trust doctrine, the Clean W ater Act, Superfund, Montana's Superfund, and
z^ricultural water use. In addition, "The Clark Fork Basin Project Status Report and Action
Plan"^4 is being used as a source o f technical data on water quality. Together these people

72 Issues that the plan should address and tools for addressing them were also generated.
73 Northern Lights, "Upper Clark Fork Steering Committee, October 28, 1991 Meeting
Summary," p. 6 - 7.
74 Johnson, Howard E. (1988).
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and paper resources provide the overview of the Basin on which Committee members will
base their management plan.
In general, the Com mittee's basis o f information is limited by it members'
perceptions o f what they need to know and the limited availability and knowledge of local
experts. W hile this is a substantial resource o f information, it is still limited. Laws,
physical water availability, water use, fish and w ildlife needs, water quality, and
Superfund are constraints within which the management plan must be formed. Although
this list seems fairly comprehensive, the fact that each category of information is treated as
if it were discrete and separate from the others could be regarded as a serious shortcoming.
Because the experts who provide the information tend to be specialists in a single area, the
interconnections between these qualities of the Basin are unrepresented. In a similar vein,
the Basin has not been addressed as an ecological system. Although fish and wildlife needs
are being considered, there has been no mention of ecology in the process.
These omissions are serious shortcomings in the Basin Committee's information
base. W ithout consideration of ecology and the interrelation o f the Basin's parts, it is
extremely unlikely that the management plan will be developed with a view toward
sustainability. Because the Committee has been guided in its orientation and consequent
information needs by the reservation dispute, its information base does not reflect broader
ecological concerns. As a result, its management plan may satisfy Basin humans at the
expense of the landscape.

Interpretation. In general, the Committee's activities at this early stage do not
reveal major breakthroughs in comprehensive planning. Judging from the agenda-setting
excerpt, the members will have accomplished something if they can plan their next meeting,
let alone the future of the Basin.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75
But we should not judge this too harshly. At this stage, the problem which the
Committee is supposed to solve is still being sketched in. Defining the Basin's needs and
capabilities more specifically will be undertaken after they develop a work plan. Developing
a work plan, meanwhile, hinges on clarifying the objectives o f participants. In order for
these to be clarified honestly, and without adversarial obfuscation, there must be some
degree o f trust already established in

the group. Although several members seem

comfortable with the facilitator and fairly willing to collaborate, others are n o t Initial
informational meetings and the lesser issues o f planning meeting agendas provide an
o p ^rtu n ity for these others to become more comfortable with the situation.
At the latest meeting, some o f the members began discussing what they expect to
achieve in the plan. One member emphasized that quantified economic values shouldn’t be
the basis for the plan. Another advocated water marketing, but also emphasized that
economic values should not obscure everyone's right to be here.^^ This suggests a kind of
folk wisdom that basing our lives and decisicwis simply on economic considerations is not a
good idea. Although both of these members seemed primarily concerned with preserving
cultural values in the face of economic change, similar reasoning could be extended to relate
market forces to ecological values. The relation o f established culture to the changing
economic demands on the Basin, makes for a strange but interesting analogy to the relation
of established ecological patterns and changing economic demands on the Basin landscape.
Such an analogy may have potential as a tool for ecological education within the Committee
and the Basin. It may provide a way to introduce Basin members to their role respecting the
sustainability o f cultural demands within the Basin.
Unless ecology becomes part of the Committee's information base, it is unlikely
that sustainability will be addressed. Whether there is even time to address this in addition
DNRC; "Upper Clark Fork River Basin Steering Committee Minutes - April 15, 1992."
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to the water reservation issue is also extremely dubious. Because the Committee has a
formal mandate, the members are under pressure to produce a plan. The Committee needs
to focus on problem solving, not learning ecology. In view o f this, introducing ideas of
ecology and sustainability to the member's consideration may depend on framing them in
terms of the reservation dispute. In the event that the Committee members discover the
shortcomings o f a segmented information base, it could become useful to develop
interrelations between the Basin’s many qualities. One way to do this might be to facilitate a
group o f discrete experts. The viability of this remains to be seen.
In the meantime, there is reason to influence the Committee opportunistically in the
interest o f promoting its ecological awareness. The tool kit described as a way o f dealing
with disagreem ents is also useful for other problems. In this case, advocacy and
intervention are ways for an observer to promote ecology within the Committee. Much as a
member’s intervention promotes collaboration, an outsider's intervention can promote
ecological awareness. Constant advocacy adds to this.
Finally, although the sustainability o f human use o f the Basin's waterways is not
presently an issue, successful collaboration could still contribute to this end. If Basin
members can begin to think o f the Basin as a common home in which all o f their interests
must be balanced, they will be much closer than present to thinking of themselves as an
ecological community. Thinking in relation to one another as humans may exclude the
interests o f other species, but is at least a species o f thinking in relation to others. This
provides a framework which is ecological in spite of itself. The Committee may not have
time to consider ecology per se, but its success could help this come more naturally at a
later date.
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IV. Conclusion
For untold generations, the mainstem Clark Fork Valley was a travel corridor
between homelands o f Salish and Nez Perce people and the great herds o f buffalo on the
plains. In these times, people hunted the Basin during travel, took poles and firewood from
its hillsides, drank, fished and bathed in its waters. The Basin was also a buffer zone
insulating them from their enemies on the plains, the Blackfeet. Periodic burning was a
consequence o f political activity in the basin then. It helped clear trails and preserve an
overstory to hide migrating families from the sight of their enemies. Although this shaped
the Basin's landscape, it did not necessarily taint the basin with human interference. The
political species is as much a part o f Upper Clark Fork Basin as White Tail Deer and
Douglas Fir.
Today, the political dwellers of the Basin belong to a different culture. These people
have different ancestries, different interests and different institutions from the natives who
went before them. They are different from one another as well, and rarely act as a single
group. Today, the basin is not only a travel corridor, but a permanent residence for many
people and their economic activities. Many decisions that affect the basin are made by
individual property owners on the basis o f culturally accepted, liberal political principles
that grant the right o f control with ownership. Accountability to the larger community,
human and ecological, is provided for as an afterthought by such devices as zoning
regulations. This is overseen by representatives of the government at municipal, county and
state levels. Public lands and resources are ruled over by a similar array of governmental
units, including administrative agencies and boards whose jurisdictions often overlap.
This dispersion o f political activity through so many institutions and individual
interests makes it difficult to form a coherent picture of the collective impact on the Basin’s
ecology. The people who affect the basin today are not one group and do not act as one
group. The Basin, however, must sustain all o f their impacts. Our institutions do not
77
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facilitate comprehensive planning, although they do facilitate an aggregate effect. As a
result, we open ourselves up to the possibility o f having a collective effect on the
ecosystem that is neither desirable, sustainable, nor foreseeable. Our conventional
institutions set the stage for a tragedy of the commons.
What to make of all this?
In short, the importance of achieving a sustainable relationship between our culture
and the Basin landscape recommends that we find new institutions. Collaboration is a
promising option. It is a way o f drawing the many diverse interests of Basin humans
together into agreements that reflect a community. This enables existing cultural values to
be taken up and included instead o f opposed and supplanted with something alien. At the
same time, however, the value o f cooperation and constructive discourse is nurtured. An
atmosphere o f collaboration enables value differences and diverse understandings o f the
problem at hand to come together in a kind of cross-fertilization of ideas. By reframing the
problems o f individuals as community problems, the problem solving energies of the many
community members are united and focussed on a single problem rather than turned against
one another.
The problems confronting the Upper Clark Fork Basin Committee are difficult, but
there is good reason to persevere in trying to generate discourse and agreement What other
options are there? It is true that leaving the decision to officials might lead to a policy that
would protect the environment in principle, but who would enforce it? At the same time,
something must be said for the rights of the Basin’s citizens —shouldn't they have a say in
decisions that affect their lives and homes? Property rights aside, there is a deeper issue in
question regarding the rights o f citizens to choose their own fate and have control over their
lives and the political institutions o f their country.
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This raises the issue o f how to balance environmental values and democratic values.
This can be thought o f more generally as the problem of making good decisions in a
democratic manner. "Good decisions" in this case means decisions that are informed by
ecology, by an understanding of how our actions affect the environment and the larger
community around us. Local collaboration is a form o f decision-making that enables local
people to take responsibility for the policies that they must live with. At the same time, it
provides a forum in which ecologists and experts in various fields can interact with these
citizens in order to integrate expert and local knowledge. In view of this, it has the potential
to generate good, inclusive, democratic decisions —but only if the process includes people
who understand the local ecology and are committed to seeing it respected.
Ultimately, political activity is ecological, whether it regards ecology or n o t It is an
ecological force whether or not we think o f it as an ecological process. So far as public
decisions guide our actions and actions affect our living environment, this much is clear.
This is not a revelation, but a starting point for thinking about how our political decisions
affect the ecological complexity in which we live. That is, we begin by recognizing that our
decisions will have such an effect. Rather than thinking o f human society as being separate
from nature — separate from ecosystems, society can be thought o f as part of a living
whole. From this standpoint, ecology is no more o f a special interest than life is a special
interest; it is our foundation and the frame of all our ends. In this context the role of
environmentalists is not to banish people from nature, but to promote the recognition that
we are part of nature and bring this into our decisions and activities.
Collaborative processes provide a path to follow into the vague territory o f
undefined agreements and communities. For those o f us who support both democracy and
ecology, this journey is a matter o f integrity; a quest in search o f balance between the oft'
dilemmic horns o f ecology and democracy. Finding such a balance is worthy of ourselves
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and worthy o f our children. It is "for the seventh generation." In this spirit, we pursue
constructive dialogue with adversarial neighbors. The Basin Committee's efforts to
collaborate are a step in this direction. Whether the path will lead to sustainability remains
to be seen. In the meantime, we can continue to plant the seeds of constructive dialogue and
ecological understanding. "Let the dialogue grow!"

A thick braid o f meaning is a stronger cultural tie than any one thread;
With it we can weave a social fabric to re place fragments of modernity.
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